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No OTHER GODS BEFORE ME:* SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM
DAVEED GARTENSTEIN-ROSS**
1. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between Christianity and Islam vaulted to great national
importance following the September 11, 2001 attacks and the "war on terror" that
the United States declared thereafter. Since the attacks, various commentators
have attempted to contextualize the role that religion plays in this conflict. For
example, Salman Rushdie, in a much-discussed New York Times op-ed, declared
bluntly that the war in Afghanistan following the September 11 th attacks was
"about Islam."' On the other hand, the Toronto Star editorialized: "That the Sept.
11 hijackers were Arab Muslims says no more than that Timothy McVeigh was
Christian or Baruch Goldstein was Jewish."2 But regardless of these differences
"Exodus 20:3 ("You shall have no other gods before me."). Cf THE MEANING OF THE HOLY QUR'AN
10:66 (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans., 10th ed. 1999) ("Behold! verily to Allah belong all creatures, in the
heavens and on earth. What do they follow who worship as His 'partners' other than Allah? They
follow nothing but fancy, and they do nothing but lie.").
." Associate, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP; J.D. 2002, New York University School of Law; B.A.
1998, Wake Forest University. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Brian S. Prestes, with whom I
engaged in a number of useful discussions about this article; he also made significant contributions to
Part 11. I would like to thank Tom Hale for excellent research assistance, and would also like to thank
Michaelle Browers, Duane Castro, Robin J. Effron, Jordan Gans-Morse, John Hughes, Rashad Hussain,
Benedict Kingsbury, Matt Rice, Robert Shaw, Christi Siver, Laurie Straus, Eric Truett, David Weinstein
and Lee S. Wolosky for their comments and criticisms. Most of all, I thank my beautiful wife, Amy
Powell, for her insightful comments on this manuscript, and for her extraordinary perseverance and
understanding during the time that I spent working on this and other projects.
1. Salman Rushdie, Yes, This Is About Islam, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2001, at A25.
In a similar (although far from identical) vein, a number of books advancing sharp critiques of Islam
were published following the September I I attacks. See, e.g., ERGUN CANER & EMIR CANER,
UNVEILING ISLAM: AN INSIDER'S LOOK AT MUSLIM LIFE AND BELIEFS (2002); MARK A. GABRIEL,
ISLAM AND TERROISM: WHAT THE QuRAN REALLY TEACHES ABOUT CHRISTIANITY, VIOLENCE, AND
THE GOALS OF THE ISLAMIC JIHAD (2002); ROBERT SPENCER, ISLAM UNVEILED: DISTURBING
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE WORLD'S FASTEST GROwING FAITH (2002).
2. It's Folly to Blame Islam for Hatred, Fanaticism, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 9, 2001, at A13; see
also Scott Alexander, Inalienable Rights?: Muslims in the U.S. Since September 11th, 7 J. ISLAMIC L.
& CULTURE 103, 124 (2002) ("1 cannot help but ask how, on the level of rhetoric, these popular
Christian preachers [who have been severely critical of Islam] are any different than an Osama bin
Laden?").
Whether McVeigh actually considered himself to be Christian-as the Toronto Star's quote suggests-
is, at the very least, debatable. See Maggie Gallagher, Timothy McVeigh, Christian Terrorist,
TOWNHALL.COM, Oct. 28, 2002, at
http://www.townhall.com/columnists/maggiegallagher/mg20021028.shtml (arguing that the notion of
"Timothy McVeigh, Christian terrorist" is a "patent falsehood" in light of the fact that Jesus made no
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between commentators, virtually nobody would argue that religion is simply
irrelevant to the war on terror. Whether it is expressed through fears that combat
on Islamic soil will inflame the Muslim street3 or concern about the influx of
Christian missionaries that have tended to follow such military operations,4
virtually all observers agree that religion is a significant factor in this conflict.
Without a proper appreciation of both Muslim religious sensibilities and the
manner in which the West is perceived by that faith's adherents, policymakers do
indeed risk exacerbating extant problems, by, for example, increasing public
sympathy for terrorists within the Islamic world. Thus, this article describes a
powerful strain of thought that has historically existed within both Christianity and
Islam, and that continues to guide a significant number of both faiths' adherents
today. This strain of thought holds that both religions possess distinct
geographical "spheres of influence," in the same way that nation-states are thought
to possess their own spheres of influence.5 Thus, Christians whose worldviews are
shaped by this concept will be very concemed about perceived encroachments into
the "Christian West," while Muslims who share this perspective will be worried
about the erosion of Islam's power within the "Islamic world."
The notion that Christianity and Islam possess distinct geographical spheres
of influence is by no means universally held by Christians and Muslims. However,
a large number of adherents to both faiths conceptualize their religion as
possessing a geographical sphere of influence. Moreover, the believers who hold
this view tend to wield disproportionate influence within both faiths.6 This view
thus merits our attention, since even small, committed groups of believers have
often heavily influenced the course that Christianity and Islam have followed.7 A
framework for understanding the interactions between the Christian world and
Muslim world that takes into account this perception of religious spheres of
influence can thus help to reduce the potential for conflict between the two faiths.
appearance in McVeigh's rhetoric, McVeigh "had no furn convictions about an afterlife," and McVeigh
was described as "'an avowed agnostic' whose sudden last-minute decision to see a Catholic priest just
before his execution surprised everyone who knew him").
3. See, e.g., Rajan Menon, Why Russia Says 'Nyet' to the U.S., CHI. TRIB., Mar. 12, 2003, at 23C
("An American war against Iraq followed by a prolonged occupation could inflame the Muslim
world.").
4. See, e.g., Chandra Muzaffar, Evangelising the World, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malaysia), July
21, 2003, at 10; David Van Biema, Missionaries Under Cover, TIME, June 30, 2003, at 36.
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. Their influence is magnified by the fact that they tend to be more religiously inclined-often
including acknowledged leaders of both religions-and hence more likely to lobby the state or
undertake independent action on their faith's behalf.
7. Examples of this phenomenon include the Reformation, wherein a small group of thinkers led
a major theological revolution within Christianity, see OWEN CHADWICK, THE REFORMATION (1964);
the rise of Wahhabism, which was made possible by the alliance between the theologian Muhammad
ibn Abdul Wahhab and the political leader Muhammad ibn Saud, see DORE GOLD, HATRED'S
KINGDOM: How SAUDI ARABIA SUPPORTS THE NEW GLOBAL TERRORISM 17-21 (2003); and the life of
Sayyid Qutb, whose life and writings "inspired many of the radical Islamic movements of the 1970s and
1980s." Hamid M. Khan, Note, Nothing is Written: Fundamentalism, Revivalism, Reformism and the
Fate of Islamic Law, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 273, 308 (2002).
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The spheres of influence concept is usually identified with both realist and
neorealist theories of international relations (IR), which argue that nation-states
seek to maximize their power.8  The perception of Christians and Muslims who
believe that their faith possesses a geographic sphere of influence mirrors the
predictions of realist IR theories; these adherents view their faith as operating in a
manner similar to the nation-state, with the religion's power waxing or waning in
relation to a variety of competitors. Indeed, they may view their religion as a more
vital and more legitimate actor than the nation-state. 9 However, this article
employs liberal IR theory to examine how this perception of religious spheres of
influence affects the way that individuals and states behave internationally. In
contrast to realism, the liberal theory of international relations places greater
emphasis on state-society relations than on the structural relationship between
nation-states. 10
Although realist theory holds that spheres of influence are only one strategy
among many that nation-states may employ to expand their power, Christians and
Muslims who believe that their faith possesses a geographic component view
spheres of influence as far more important to their religion than to nation-states.
Such believers perceive spheres of influence as an essential strategy. In part, they
think spheres of influence are important for reasons rooted in the history and
doctrines of both faiths,"1 but there is also a structural reason for this view. This
structural reason derives from the facts that while religions may be powerful
elements within the state-and while some religions may even deny that any
separation should exist between the state and the faith12-religions are not
themselves coterminous with the nation-state. Instead, both Christianity and Islam
are today forced to vie for power within the state. The spheres of influence
strategy provides the nation-state a reason to act on the dominant religion's behalf
and also generates pressure from the faithful demanding that the state do So.
13
8. See JOHN T. ROURKE, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ON THE WORLD STAGE 17-18 (7th ed. 1999);
see also infra Part II.B. L.a (discussing realist IR theories).
9. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part II.B. .b (explaining liberal theory).
11. See infra Parts III.A and IV.A.
12. See Donna E. Arzt, Religious Human Rights in Muslim States of the Middle East and North
Africa, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 139, 143 (1996) ("There is no separation of 'mosque and state' in
Islam."); see also infra note 103 and accompanying text.
13. This structural reason for reliance on spheres of influence raises the obvious question of
whether adherents to other major world religions also perceive their faiths as possessing geographic
spheres of influence. Some evidence suggests that this perception of spheres of influence may indeed
extend to other religions.
For example, the recent wave of brutal attacks on missionaries in India suggests that some Hindus may
believe that Christianity is invading their faith's sphere of influence. See generally Marion Lloyd, Fear
and Violence Stalk Christians and Muslims in India, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 8, 1999, at A13
(describing the rape of several nuns, as well as an incident in which fifteen men barged into a church
and murdered a Roman Catholic priest); Paul Marshall, Hinduism and Terror, FIRST THINGS, June 1,
2004, at 10 ("In the past decade, extremist Hindus have increased their attacks on Christians, until there
are now several hundred per year."); Alessandra Stanley, Pope Tells India His Church Has a Right to
Evangelize, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1999, at A3 ("Anti-Christian attacks by Hindu fundamentalists, often
encouraged by political extremists, have increased dramatically in the last two years, with more than
2005
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Both Christianity and Islam enjoy religious primacy within their perceived
spheres of influence. Many adherents to both faiths seek to expand these spheres
of influence while simultaneously preventing competitors from gaining a foothold
within them. One way these adherents attempt to expand their religions' spheres
of influence is through aggressive proselytism. 14 Also, both religions often employ
the coercive power of the state to increase their power and inhibit competitors'
150 recorded incidents of church lootings, beatings, rapes and killings.").
Most Buddhist states impose limitations on minority faiths within their borders, sometimes in a
dramatic fashion. In Bhutan, both proselytism by citizens of non-Buddhist faiths and also religious
conversions are prohibited. DEP'T OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 2001 at 507 (2001) [hereinafter REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM]. Dissidents have also
reported that "Buddhist religious teaching ... is permitted in schools; however, the teaching of other
religious traditions is not." Id. at 508. In Burma, governmental authorities prohibit Christian
proselytism in some areas, and in one instance "clergy were beaten to discourage proselytizing." Id. at
115. Christian groups have also experienced "increasing difficulties in obtaining permission to build
new churches," and are not legally allowed to import translations of the Bible into indigenous
languages. Id. at 115-16. Burmese Muslims face even greater restrictions, as they "report that they
essentially are banned from constructing any new mosques anywhere in the country." Id. at 113. The
Burmese government has gone so far as establishing "Muslim-free zones" where no Muslims are
permitted to live and mosques have been destroyed. Id. at 118. In Laos, foreigners are legally
prohibited from proselytizing, and religious conversions are also prohibited in certain localities. Id. at
173. The Laotian government has also arrested a number of adherents to minority faiths for their
religious activities. Id. at 175; see also NINA SHEA, IN THE LION'S DEN: A SHOCKING ACCOUNT OF
PERSECUTION AND MARTYRDOM OF CHRISTIANS TODAY & How WE SHOULD RESPOND 84 (1997)
(explaining that a Protestant pastor was imprisoned on charges of "showing a video without permission,
'causing division,' and illegally 'spreading his faith'). The Laotian government has explicitly
criticized Christianity as "a Western or imperialist 'import' into the country," REPORT ON RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM, supra, at 174, thus suggesting that the government may view attempts at propagating
Christianity as an intrusion on a perceived Buddhist "sphere of influence."
Similarly, the Jewish nature of the State of Israel is codified in its laws. See Declaration on the
Establishment of the State of Israel, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 3, 4, (1948) (providing for "the establishment of a
Jewish State in Eretz-lsrael [the Land of Israel]"); Basic Law: The Knesset (Amendment No. 9), 39
L.S.I. 216 (1984-85) (providing that a candidates' list cannot participate in Knesset elections if one of
its objects is "negation of the existence of the State of Israel as the State of the Jewish people"). One
commentator has noted that Israel's Jewish character is also demonstrated by "the fact that the Sabbath
and the Jewish holidays have been declared to be the official days of rest for the majority of the
population, that the flag and emblem express Jewish tradition, and that the army has to provide only
Kosher food to its soldiers." Ruth Lapidoth, Freedom of Religion and of Conscience in Israel, 47
CATH. U.L. REV. 441,443 (1998).
However, one area where other major world religions differ from Christianity and Islam is proselytism.
Christianity and Islam are both firmly committed to expanding their spheres of influence through
proselytism. See J. Paul Martin, Christianity and Islam: Lessons from Africa, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV.
401, 402 (1998); see also infra Parts III and IV. The other major world religions are generally non-
evangelical. See Garrett Epps, What We Talk About When We Talk About Free Exercise, 30 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 563, 572 n.35 (1998) ("Jews do not proselytize or seek converts among the Gentiles."); Kinji
Kanazawa, Being a Buddhist and a Lawyer, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171, 1171 (1998) ("Buddhism is not
an evangelical or apostolic creed; it does not seek followers, yet it encourages anyone who would
follow the path to enlightenment."); Ruti Teitel, A Critique of Religion as Politics in the Public Sphere,
78 CORNELL L. REV. 747, 810 n.272 (noting "Hinduism's prominent ethos against evangelizing"). The
question of whether adherents to other major world religions also believe that their faiths possess
geographic spheres of influence may be a fruitful subject for future research.
14. See infra Parts III.A.4, III.B.3, IVA.1, IV.B.I.
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growth (although in the contemporary context, this is done more frequently and
more dramatically in the Islamic world). Individual adherents to the dominant
religion may simultaneously attempt to discourage competitors' growth
independent of the state's policies. In their extreme form, these efforts may result
in religiously motivated violence, but such efforts are not always so sinister.
The main competitors that Christianity and Islam face within their perceived
spheres of influence today are other faiths, secularism, and certain sects within the
same religion. Despite this variegated competition, Christians who believe in a
Christian sphere of influence are especially wary of Islam, while Muslims who
believe in an Islamic sphere of influence are especially wary of Christianity. This
mutual suspicion stems both from the faiths' historical relationship and also from
the fact that, in the words of R. Albert Mohler, president of the Southern Baptist
Theological Seminary, they are "major competitors... for the convictions and the
souls of human beings around the world."' 15  Indeed, while Christianity is the
world's largest faith, 16 Islam is acknowledged to be one of the world's fastest
growing religions.'
7
Part II explains the concept of spheres of influence. Thereafter, Parts III and
IV illuminate the perception held by a significant number of Muslims and
Christians that their faiths possess geographic spheres of influence, as well as the
historical and contemporary strategies that adherents to both religions have
employed to preserve and expand these spheres.'
8
Finally, this article concludes by discussing the predictive value of applying
the spheres of influence concept to the relationship between Christianity and Islam,
and by suggesting policy prescriptions that follow from the concept's application.
If Western policymakers are sensitive to the widespread perception in the Muslim
world that the Islamic faith possesses a geographical sphere of influence, and if
they are aware of the potential for their own actions to be perceived as attempts to
extend the Christian sphere of influence, then they should be able to reduce the
15. R. Albert Mohler, quoted in R. Albert Mohler Discusses His Support for Allowing Christian
Evangelist Missionaries to Proselytize in Iraq, FRESH AIR, May 5, 2003 (NPR), LEXIS, News Library,
News Group File.
16. Christianity claims about two billion adherents. See, e.g., Amy Lee, Iraq Echoes Easter
Theme; Situation Mirrors Biblical Rebirth, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 20, 2003, at IC; Visual Bible
International Begins Filming the Gospel of John, Bus. WIRE, Jan. 27, 2003, at LEXIS, News Library,
News Group File.
17. Islam is often described as the world's fastest-growing faith. See, e.g., The Gods That Failed,
EcoNoMiST, Sept. 13, 2003, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File; Michael Pakenham, Gregorian
Succinctly Explores the Global Complexity ofIslam, BALT. SUN, June 15, 2003, at I IF; Steven Simon,
The New Terrorism: Securing the Nation Against a Messianic Foe, BROOKINGS REV., Jan. 1, 2003, at
21. However, some controversy exists about whether Islam or Christianity is actually growing more
rapidly. See PHILIP JENKINS, THE NEXT CHRISTENDOM: THE COMING OF GLOBAL CHRISTIANITY 5-6
(2002) (arguing that Christianity is, in fact, the world's fastest-growing religion).
18. My goal in writing this article is not to engage theological controversies within either
Christianity or Islam. While some authors writing about the darker moments in the history of both
faiths have attempted to distinguish the religions' "true" doctrines from the manner in which the faiths
have been manipulated, I am content to leave this analysis to theologians. Instead, I am concerned with
how adherents to these religions have behaved-and continue to behave-in practice.
2005
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potential for their pursuit of the war on terror-as well as other actions that they
take within the perceived Muslim sphere of influence-to result in more recruits to
the terrorists' cause.
II. FRAMEWORK
This Part describes the "spheres of influence" framework. Part II.A defines
and discusses the spheres of influence concept in the context of the nation-state
because this is the context in which scholars have traditionally understood and
developed the concept. Part II.B then discusses how the idea of spheres of
influence can help to produce a better understanding of the relations between
Christianity and Islam.
A.Nation-States' Use of Spheres of Influence
1. Early Use of Spheres of Influence
A "sphere of influence" is a geographic area within which a dominant state
exerts its power and attempts to exclude other states outside the region from doing
so. 19 A state's sphere of influence will, of course, include the territory within its
own borders. But, in addition, a state's sphere of influence will typically include
an area beyond its borders. This area may be large or small. It may be one that the
state firmly controls and from which the state successfully excludes competing
states, or it may be a sort of buffer zone or disputed frontier area in which a state
struggles with other states for influence or supremacy. A state's sphere of
influence is like a set of concentric circles, the innermost being the state's own
territory, often followed by geographic areas that are outside of the state but that
the state controls (through allegiances, agreements, or even brute force), and
ending with the outermost circle, which includes contested regions overlapping
with the outermost spheres of another state (or states). The outermost circles,
where states' spheres overlap, are where inter-state conflicts commonly emerge.
The term "spheres of influence" describes more than just geographic areas,
however. It also describes a strategy that has been used since the advent of the
nation-state. The strategic concept of "spheres of influence" refers to the method
by which states define, defend, and expand territory under their control, while
attempting to undermine competing states' attempts to do the same. They employ
this strategy in order to maintain their security or increase their power. States may
establish tacit spheres of influence by exerting military or economic might within a
less powerful region, or merely by announcing their intent to do so. States may
formally establish spheres of influence through agreements, either between the
more powerful state and the less powerful state within its sphere, or between two
powerful states that agree not to interfere in each others' spheres of influence.
Such agreements may be consensual or coercive. 20 It is this sense of the term-
19. Henry Kissinger, for example, has described "spheres of influence" as assigning
"preponderant influence over large regions to specific powers." HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 40-41
(1994).
20. For a description of how spheres of influence may be established by core states with the
consent of peripheral states, see Charles A. Kupchan, After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional
Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity, INT'L SEC., Fall 1998, at 42 (describing the
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spheres of influence as a strategy-that is central to this article's analysis of the
relations between Christianity and Islam.
In the United States, perhaps the earliest explicit manifestation of the spheres
of influence strategy was the Monroe Doctrine-President Monroe's famous
decision in 1823 to exclude European powers from the Western Hemisphere. The
traditional realist view of this doctrine is that it "arose from the attempt of the Holy
Alliance-composed of Prussia, Russia, and Austria-to suppress the revolution in
Spain in the 1820s. ' '21 The United States, fearing that the Holy Alliance's
intervention in Spain would spill over into intervention in Spain's colonies in Latin
America, responded with a policy designed to exclude European colonialism from
the Americas.22 The Monroe Doctrine moved American foreign policy from
merely opposing American intervention in struggles in Europe to opposing
European intervention in the Americas.23 It defined the United States' sphere of
influence as encompassing all of the Western Hemisphere.
"For the greater part of American history," the Monroe Doctrine defined "the
American national interest., 24 After defining its sphere of influence, the United
States exerted its power to defend and enlarge this sphere of influence by keeping
other states out. For example, Henry Kissinger describes President Polk's 1845
incorporation of Texas into the United States and President Andrew Johnson's
1868 purchase of Alaska as preemptive efforts by the United States to defend its
sphere of influence against even the possibility of an outside threat.25' By the early
1900s, the United States had gone so far as to proclaim its sovereignty over
virtually all of North America and had strongly encouraged, if not forced, even
Great Britain to abandon its role there.26 The Monroe Doctrine was alive and well
in 1919, when President Wilson unhesitatingly cited it as a focal point of the new
international order that he envisioned.27 And in 1939, soon after the Nazi
occupation of Prague, President Franklin D. Roosevelt argued that "the continued
political, economic and social independence of every small nation in the world
does have an effect on our national safety and prosperity. Each one that disappears
weakens our national safety and prosperity. 28 Although the United States did not
act on this articulated principle until after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor,
President Roosevelt's reasoning was an aggressive application of the spheres of
concept of "benign unipolarity").
21. KISSINGER, supra note 19, at 35. For the view held by liberal IR theorists, see infra notes 74-
76 and accompanying text.
22. Id.
23. Message of President Monroe to Congress, December 2, 1823, in THE RECORD OF AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY 182 (Ruhl J. Bartlett ed., 1954); see also Captain Davis Brown, The Role of Regional
Organizations in Stopping Civil Wars, 41 A.F. L. REv. 235, 238 (1997).
24. KISSINGER, supra note 19, at 812-13.
25. Id. at 36-37.
26. As an example of spheres of influence at work in the early twentieth century, Kissinger cites
President Theodore Roosevelt's understanding that the United States was to exert its influence in the
Western Hemisphere and that Great Britain was to do the same on the Indian subcontinent. Id. at 40-41.
27. Id. at 235.
28. Id. at 383 (quoting FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 13 COMPLETE PRESIDENTIAL PRESS
CONFERENCES OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT 262 (1939)).
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influence paradigm: America, in order to defend its sphere, will defend smaller
countries to prevent the emergence of threats to its core territory.
The United States is not the only country to adopt the spheres of influence
paradigm. Kissinger observes, for example, that Russia had, for two hundred years
before Stalin arrived on the scene, continuously attempted to resolve disputes with
its neighbors
bilaterally rather than at international conferences. Neither Alexander I in the
1820s, Nicholas I thirty years later, nor Alexander II in 1878 understood why
Great Britain insisted on interposing itself between Russia and Turkey. In
these and subsequent instances, Russian leaders took the position that they were
entitled to a free hand in dealing with their neighbors.
29
2. The Cold War
The Cold War, and the strategy of containment that accompanied it, was the
most vivid realization of the spheres of influence concept.30  For approximately
forty years, the United States and Soviet Union each defined a sphere of influence,
defended it primarily against intrusion by the other, and attempted to enlarge it at
the expense of the other.3 1 Just as the Soviet Union viewed the United States as
inherently and ideologically expansive, 32 the United States viewed the Soviet
Union in the same way, understanding the world as one of zero-sum competition in
which any gain for the Soviets was a loss for the Americans.33
As a result of both countries' perceptions that the other power posed a
substantial threat, bipolar competition between the United States and Soviet Union
was intense during the Cold War. This competition resulted in a virtual dividing of
the planet into either part of the United States' sphere of influence, part of the
Soviet Union's sphere, or in some instances neutral or nonaligned blocks. Samuel
Huntington describes this period: "For the forty years of the Cold War, conflict
permeated downward as the superpowers attempted to recruit allies and partners
and to subvert, convert, or neutralize the allies and partners of the other
29. Id. at 432.
30. The strategy of containment was first proposed by George Kennan, writing pseudonymously
as "X." See George F. Kennan, writing as "X" in The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 566
(July 1947). Kennan warned of Soviet expansionism, and wrote that the United States' proper response
"was to conduct a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies
until either the break up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power." Id.
31. See James B. Steinberg, Policy and Principles: The Clinton Administration's Approach, 19
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1340, 1341 (1996) (noting that the idea of containment "set the direction for more
than forty years of U.S. foreign policy"); Michael Hahn, Book Review, 3 GEO. PUBLIC POL'Y REV. 209,
209 (1998) (reviewing RICHARD HAASS, THE RELUCTANT SHERIFF: THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE
COLD WAR (1997)).
32. See HENRY A. KISSINGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY 51-52 (abridged ed.
1958) (explaining that, because the Soviet Union viewed conflict between capitalist and Communist
countries as inevitable, "[c]onciliatory American statements will ... appear to Soviet leaders either as
hypocrisy or stupidity, ignorance or propaganda").
33. Id. at 3 ("Because harmony between different social systems is explicitly rejected by Soviet
doctrine, the renunciation of force will create a vacuum into which the Soviet leadership can move with
impunity.").
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superpower." 34  The United States, for example, announced the Truman
Doctrine-a policy, modeled on the Monroe Doctrine and intellectually rooted in
the spheres of influence paradigm, of allying with and defending democratic
nations throughout the world.35  The Soviets did the same for their Communist
counterparts.
To illustrate, the United States expanded its sphere by exerting influence over
Western Europe (countries such as West Germany and Italy), Northeast Asia
(Japan), and the Persian Gulf. The Soviet Union did the same by defining several
Eastern European countries as its client states. Soviet leaders required these
satellite states to consult with the Soviet Union, and had the right to pick their
heads of government. 36 Frequently, "appointments to major Party positions in
Eastern Europe were only given to those individuals with extensive experience in
Moscow." 37 The Soviet Union was able to pursue such a heavy-handed Eastern
Europe policy because "[t]he Americans accepted a Soviet sphere of influence."
38
Although the United States and Soviet Union occasionally directly asserted
themselves within each other's spheres of influence during the Cold War,39 they
did so rarely. Both powers were far more likely to try to alter policies within the
other's sphere through persuasion or attempts to create an international consensus
in order to pressure the other power into altering the policies it pursued within its
sphere of influence.
B. Spheres of Influence in the Relationship Between Christianity and Islam
1. Theoretical Foundations of the Spheres of Influence Concept
Two separate IR theories-realism and liberal theory-help to shed light on
the implications of Christians' and Muslims' perception that their religions possess
geographic spheres of influence. Realist IR theory illuminates the perception of
believers who hold that their faith possesses a geographic sphere of influence;
these adherents view their faith as operating in a manner similar to nation-states,
34. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD
ORDER 272 (1996).
35. The Truman Doctrine was an expression of America's new strategy of containment of the
Soviet Union. One element of America's containment strategy was to defend "all future targets of
Soviet expansion." JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF
POSTwAR AMERICAN NATIONAL SEcuRrrY POLICY 21 (1982). The Truman Doctrine, proclaimed on
March 12, 1947, stated that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures." Id. at 22.
36. Stephen D. Krasner, Making Peace Agreements Work: The Implementation and Enforcement
of Peace Agreements Between Sovereigns and Intermediate Sovereigns, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 651,
668 (1997).
37. Id. at 666.
38. Id. at 668.
39. One example is the Soviet Union's activities in Latin America during the 1980s. See, e.g.,
George Gedda, Salvadoran Gets a US. Visa Despite Being Murder Suspect, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort
Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec. 13, 1996, at 2A (mentioning that leftist guerillas in El Salvador in the 1980s
were backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba); T. Christian Miller, Ortega Tries to Disarm Terror as an
Election Issue, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2001, at A28 (mentioning that the Soviet Union was linked to the
Sandinistas in Nicaragua).
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with the religion's power either increasing or decreasing relative to such
competitors as other faiths, secularism, and "deviant" sects within the same
religion. In turn, liberal IR theory helps us to understand how this perception of
religious spheres of influence affects the behavior of individuals and states on an
international level.
a. Realism
The spheres of influence concept is most consistent with, though not
inextricably linked to, the realist school of IR articulated by political scientists
such as Hans Morganthau, ° Kenneth Waltz, 41 and John Mearsheimer. 42 Realists
hold "three core beliefs. 43 First, realists hold that states are the principal actors in
international politics." Second, realists believe that the anarchic international
system, rather than the internal characteristics of states, primarily dictates states'
behavior.45 Realism's third and final core belief is that states compete for power or
security."
According to the defensive realism commonly associated with Waltz, states
focus on maintaining the status quo--not on maximizing their power, but on
maintaining what they have.47 According to defensive realism: "The international
system itself provides incentives for expansion and aggressive strategies only
under very limited conditions. States can often achieve security by pursuing
40. See HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND
PEACE (5th ed. 1972).
41. See KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979).
42. See JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (2001). There is no
single "realist" theory. Rather, realism is "a collection of approaches with differing points of emphasis"
converging on a few central tenets. See JONATHAN HASLAM, NO VIRTUE LIKE NECESSITY: REALIST
THOUGHT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE MACHIAVELLI 12 (2002). One may divide the realist
school into several sub-categories of realism, ranging from "classical realism" (also sometimes labeled
"human nature realism"), see MORGENTHAU, supra note 40, to "defensive realism" (also known as
"structural realism"), see WALTZ, supra note 41, to "offensive realism," see MEARSHEIMER, supra. See
also infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (elaborating upon the differences between offensive and
defensive realism).
43. MEARSHEIMER, supra note 42, at 17.
44. See WALTZ, supra note 41, at 104; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Interdisciplinary Approaches to
International Economic Law: Liberal International Relations Theory and International Economic Law,
10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 717, 722 (1995). Despite this core realist belief, realism is still useful in
illuminating the perception held by many Christians and Muslims that their faiths possess geographical
spheres of influence. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
45. MEARSHEIMER, supra note 42, at 17; see also John J. Mearsheimer, Disorder Restored, in
RETHINKING AMERICA'S SECURITY 222 (Graham Allison & Gregory Treverton eds., 1992) ("[T]he
international political system is anarchic, which means that each state must always be concerned to
ensure its own survival. A state can have no higher goal than survival, since profits matter little when
the enemy is occupying your country and slaughtering your citizens.").
46. MEARSHEIMER, supra note 42, at 18; see also KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE AND
WAR 238 (1959) ("Each state pursues its own interests, however defined, in ways it judges best. Force
is a means of achieving the external ends of states because there exists no consistent, reliable process of
reconciling the conflicts of interest that inevitably arise among similar units in a condition of
anarchy.").
47. See Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,
INT'L SEC., Winter 2001, at 128 (2000) (describing and defending defensive realism).
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moderate foreign policies.
' 48
In contrast, according to the offensive realism most commonly associated
with Mearsheimer, "[t]he overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of
world power" rather than merely to maintain the balance of power.49  Great
powers, according to offensive realism, have hegemony as their ultimate aim
because a state maximizes its chances for survival only by being the sole power in
the system. ° They are not content with the status quo distribution of power, but
rather seek to gain for themselves a greater share, by war if the costs are
sufficiently low, or by waiting for more favorable circumstances to initiate force. 5'
Although realism is inherently state-centered, and does not "take account of
domestic political ideology or structure, or of the multiplicity of sub-state actors
that determine state policy at the domestic level,, 5 2 realist theory has value in
helping us to understand how many Christians and Muslims believe their religions'
spheres of influence operate. After all, most Christians and Muslims who believe
that their faith possesses a geographic sphere of influence also view their religion
as an independent international actor capable of challenging the nation-state-and
perhaps, as a more legitimate actor than the nation-state. Moreover, realism's
focus on power in international relations provides further insight into how many
Christians and Muslims view the relations between Christianity and Islam. As R.
Albert Mohler noted, Christianity and Islam are "major competitors" for the
"convictions and souls" of people worldwide. 3 Many Christians and Muslims see
this competition as zero-sum, wherein any gain that Islam makes within the
Christian world produces a net loss for Christianity, and any inroads that
Christianity makes within the Muslim sphere of influence represents a net loss for
Islam.
The implications of this perception varies from believer to believer.
Mirroring Mearsheimer's offensive realism, some Christians and Muslims think
that their religion should aim for hegemony, and attempt to marginalize other
faiths that pose a major challenge. 4 On the other hand, more similar to Waltz's
48. Id. at 129
49. MEARSHEIMER, supra note 42, at 2; see also Mearsheimer, supra note 45, at 217 ("States have
historically competed with each other for military security in circumstances best characterized as a
zero-sum game. That competition, which sometimes leads to war, has long been the defining
characteristic of international politics.").
50. MEARSHEIMER, supra note 42, at 2.
51. Id.; Waltz further explicates this view:
In anarchy there is no automatic harmony.... A state will use force to attain its goals if,
after assessing the prospects for success, it values those goals more than it values the
pleasures of peace. Because each state is the final judge of its own cause, any state may at
any time use force to implement its policies. Because any state may at any time use force,
all states must constantly be ready either to counter force with force or to pay the cost of
weakness. The requirements of state action are, in this view, imposed by the
circumstances in which all states exist.
WALTZ, supra note 46, at 160.
52. Slaughter, supra note 44, at 723.
53. Mohler, supra note 15.
54. See, e.g., Van Biema, supra note 4, at 36 (quoting evangelist Luis Bush as saying, "From its
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defensive realism, some Christians and Muslims are more concerned with
maintaining the religious traditions of the societies in which they live than in
aggressively spreading their faith.
b. Liberalism
Liberal IR theory provides us with further insight into the implications of the
perception of religious spheres of influence by demonstrating how this perception
affects the way that individuals and states behave internationally. The central
insight of liberal IR theory is that "state-society relations-the relationship of
states to the domestic and transnational social context in which they are
embedded-have a fundamental impact on state behavior in world politics.
5 5
This view contrasts with realism, which holds states to be autonomous, unified
actors driven by their power position vis-A-vis other states.5 6
Traditionally, liberal scholars have downplayed their theory's salience as a
coherent alternative to realism and institutionalism. Instead, they have focused on
teleological observations that form the "liberal family." These include the
theoretical possibility of international peace,57 the strong proclivity for peace
among democratic states and capitalist economies, 58 and the propensity of liberal
states to comply with international law.59 Liberal theory is also associated with a
number of normative prescriptions that stem from its concern for the individual,
including support for human rights and free enterprise. For these reasons, some
scholars--even those sympathetic to liberalism-have stressed that it is not
"canonical, 6 ° that it "is not committed to ambitious and parsimonious structural
theory, 6 1 and that it is best seen as an "approach" as opposed to a theory.62
center in the 10/40 Window [between the tenth and fortieth latitudes], Islam is reaching out
energetically to all parts of the globe; in a similar strategy, we must penetrate [its] heart with the
liberating truth of the gospel"); see also Dinesh D'Souza, Osama's Brain; Meet Sayyid Qutb,
Intellectual Father of the Anti-Western Jihad, WKLY. STANDARD, Apr. 29, 2002, at 16 ("[Muslim
ideologue Sayyid] Qutb contended that since the West and Islam are based on radically different
principles, there is no way that Islamic society can compromise or meet the West halfway. Either the
West will prevail or Islam will prevail.").
55. Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,
51 INT'L ORG. 513, 513 (1997).
56. Liberalism can also be contrasted with institutionalism, which emphasizes regime structure as
a guide to state behavior. The three approaches are compared in id. at 514; see also generally
THEORIES OF WAR AND PEACE (Michael E. Brown et al. eds., 1998); CHARLES, W. KEGLEY, JR.,
CONTROVERSIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: REALISM AND THE NEOLIBERAL
CHALLENGE (1995).
57. MICHAEL W. DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE 206 (1997).
58. Michael Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Parts 1 and 2, 12 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 205 (1983) (democratic states); DOYLE, supra note 57, at 230 (capitalist economies).
59. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 503 (1995).
60. DOYLE, supra note 57, at 206.
61. Robert 0. Keohane, International Liberalism Reconsidered, in THE ECONOMIC LIMITS TO
MODERN POLITICS 155, 172-73 (John Dunn ed., 1990).
62. Mark W. Zacher & Richard A. Matthew, Liberal International Relations Theory: Common
Threads, Divergent Strands 2 (paper presented at the 88th Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association; Chicago, I11, 1992).
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Recently, however, Andrew Moravcsik has led an attempt to reformulate
liberal IR theory into a "nonideological and nonutopian form appropriate to
empirical social science. 63 It is this more scientific understanding of liberalism
that is useful to understanding how Christians' and Muslims' perception that their
religions possess spheres of influence affects international relations. Moravcsik
refines liberalism's focus on state-society relations into three core assumptions.
First, in contrast to realism, liberalism holds that the fundamental actors in
international politics are individuals and private groups.64 Second, liberalism holds
that states (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic
society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences.65
Third, liberalism holds that the configuration of interdependent state preferences
determines state behavior.
66
Liberalism is thus a "bottom-up" theory in which individuals and
aggregations of individuals are the primary drivers of politics. As Moravcsik
explains: "Socially differentiated individuals define their material and ideational
interests independently of politics and then advance those interests through
political exchange and collective action." 67 The state, then, is "not an actor but a
representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction
and reconstruction by coalitions of societal actors. 6 8 In this view, state behavior is
chiefly motivated by those individuals and groups able to foist their preferences on
the state-either through elections, violence, or other means.
It is important to note that this assumption applies equally to pluralistic and
tyrannical regimes; the societal coalition determining state policy can range from a
broad-based political party to a narrow cadre of elites. In each case, however, it is
sub-state, societal actors that drive policy. For this reason, liberal IR theorists see
regime type-insofar as it marks a certain arrangement of political power amongst
the societal actors within a state-as "a key determinant of what states do
internationally.,
69
Once they have captured the state, dominant societal actors convert their
beliefs and desires into "state preferences." These preferences "are by definition
causally independent of the strategies of other actors and, therefore, prior to
specific interstate political interactions. 70  Whereas realism attributes state
behavior primarily to an exogenous variable-inter-state power relations-
liberalism emphasizes the endogenous preferences of societal forces as the "first"
motivator of state behavior, relegating strategic considerations to a secondary
consideration. However, as the third assumption of liberalism listed above implies,
63. Moravcsik, supra note 55, at 513.
64. Id. at 516.
65. Id. at 518.
66. Id. at 520.
67. Id. at 517.
68. Id. at 518.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 519.
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this constraint imposed by other states is "binding.",71 Though a state's preferences
may be determined by dominant internal actors, its actual behavior must take into
account the policies of other competing or cooperating states. It is only at this
stage that power relations enter the liberal calculus. Thus, liberal theory holds that
state behavior is fundamentally driven by the preferences of dominant societal
interests, which is then constrained at the international level by the "configuration
of interdependent state preferences. 72
While spheres of influence are discussed primarily in the realist literature,73
liberal theory is capable of explaining them both as a historical phenomenon and
also as an abstract strategy. The Monroe Doctrine, for example, is traditionally
seen through a realist lens, with a young America asserting its growing strength
vis-A-vis the more established European powers.74 In this view, the desire of the
United States to exclude other powers from its "backyard" arose from a strategic
consideration, specifically the need to prevent the conflict between the Holy
Alliance and Spain from spilling into Spain's American colonies. In contrast, a
liberal reading of the Monroe Doctrine would emphasize the desire of political
elites in the United States, eager to realize their "manifest destiny," to build their
nation into a world power and promote their domestic values abroad.75 It would
also consider the influence of U.S. business interests, which were eager to avoid
European competition in Latin American markets.76
Though it identifies different factors that push states to adopt spheres of
influence as a strategy, liberalism does not differ from realism when considering
the strategic benefits of employing spheres of influence. Liberalism's assumption
that social actors-rather than nation-states-are the fundamental units of IR
analysis does not preclude liberal theorists from recognizing the importance of
power differences as a constraint on state behavior. Indeed, liberal theorists
perceive the same strategic benefits that realists see in the use of spheres of
influence.
Liberal IR theory would hold that states that fall within either the perceived
Christian or Muslim spheres of influence are likely to be subject to strong
pressures from dominant societal actors seeking to bolster their faith for two
interrelated reasons. First, states within a religion's sphere of influence are by
71. Id. at 520.
72. Id.
73. See supra Part II.B.1.A.
74. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
75. Regarding the aspirations of the new nation, no less an authority than Thomas Jefferson
remarked of the Doctrine, "[Independence] made us a nation; [the Monroe Doctrine] sets our compass
and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time .... " Quoted in Elihu Root, The
Real Monroe Doctrine, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 428, 429 (1914). Regarding the desire of the United States to
promote its ideology in Latin America, see EDWARD WEISBAND, THE IDEOLOGY OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY: A PARADIGM OF LOCKIAN LIBERALISM 22 (1973) ("The Monroe Doctrine has
traditionally been interpreted as a great statement of realism .... This, however, represents only part of
Monroe's original intent, which otherwise stemmed from ideological considerations.").
76. See generally THOMAS H. REYNOLDS, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE
(1938).
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defmition home to many adherents to that faith. The chance that the adherents'
views will be represented by the dominant societal actors is thus quite high. Even
when ruling elites themselves do not necessarily hold strong religious views, and
even when the state is formally secular-such as in Turkey or the United States-
religiously-motivated opinion is likely to carry significant sway in policymaking."
Second, beyond demographics, the fact that the state is territorially within a
religion's perceived sphere of influence is likely to strengthen religion's influence
on the state. For example, Islamist political movements 78 in Saudi Arabia
frequently invoke the fact that the kingdom is central to the Muslim Holy Land
when lobbying the state for religiously-driven policy.79 Similarly, some religious
advocates in the United States refer to America as a "Christian country" when
advancing their cause.
80
Given the strength of religious interest groups within the perceived Christian
and Muslim spheres of influence, liberal theory would predict that the policies of
states within those spheres are likely to promote the dominant religion. To the
extent that religiously-motivated actors are able to capture the state, liberal theory
would predict some degree of policy convergence amongst states falling within the
same religious sphere of influence.8'
Of course, liberalism also understands that religion is never the only interest
influencing state policy, and often not even the dominant one. Indeed, even a
theocratic state like Saudi Arabia pursues policies-such as close relations with the
United States-that run counter to a sizeable component of religious opinion
within the country.
However, many believers think that their faith should be the primary interest
motivating the state's policies. Indeed, this incongruence between the fact that
religion is often not the dominant interest motivating a state's policies while
adherents believe that it should be helps to explain the role of non-state religious
77. Regarding the United States, see generally JOHN C. GREEN ET AL., THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT IN
AMERICAN POLmCS (2003). Regarding Turkey, see generally Sami Zubaida, Trajectories of Political
Islam, in RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY (David Marquand & Ronald L. Nettler eds., 2000).
78. This article employs the term "Islamist" in the same manner that it is employed by terrorism
expert Daniel Pipes: "This is the body of ideas that takes the religion of Islam and makes it the basis of
a radical utopian ideology along the lines of fascism and Marxism-Leninism It has ambitions to
replace capitalism and liberalism as the reigning world system." Daniel Pipes, Why America is
Unpopular in the Middle East, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 13, 2001, at B9.
79. See generally AYMAN AL-YASSINI, RELIGION AND STATE IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA
(1985).
80. Pat Buchanan, Buchanan and Press, Transcript # 060502cb.463 (MSNBC television
broadcast, June 5, 2003), available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File ("This is a Christian
country, at least it was a Christian country."); see also Kent Faulk, Engel vs. Wallace Runoff Pits
Similar Conservatives, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Ala.), June 23, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library,
News Group File (quoting Republican candidate for Congress Gerry Wallace, as saying, "Somebody's
got to stand up and say, 'No, we were a Christian nation' ... And there are many today who would say
that was never true, but they're just wrong and we were better for it").
81. One example of intra-sphere policy coordination is the broad-based support of predominantly
Muslim nations for the Palestinian cause, as evidenced by their voting records in the U.N. General
Assembly.
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actors in international affairs. Islamist terrorist groups like al-Qaeda, unable to
realize their goals through state mechanisms, in essense take matters into their own
hands by directly engaging perceived enemies. 82 Because religions are not entirely
dependent on states to operate at the international level, liberalism is a useful lens
through which to view the relations between Christianity and Islam. Liberalism's
focus on individuals allows it to account for non-state actors like terrorist
networks.
While liberalism provides a valuable way to understand the relationship
between Christianity and Islam, it is ambivalent toward the nature of their
interactions. An observer influenced by realism's emphasis on structural conflict
might predict that the two faiths are predisposed to discord, as realism predicts of
nation-states.83 Conversely, liberalism maintains that the state of anarchy in which
nations and religions find themselves does not inherently bias them toward
competition; rather, conflict is a sub-systemic phenomenon. 84 In this manner,
liberalism would attribute recent hostilities between Christians and Muslims as
well as Muslim and Christian states to incompatibilities between the particular
agendas of societal actors. For example, liberal theorists saw nothing systemic
about the September I Ith attacks or their aftermath. Instead, these events were the
consequence of the desires and goals of both a small group of terrorists and also a
larger group of individuals who have a radical Islamist agenda, rather than
representative of any innate struggle between Islam and Christianity.
82. Indeed, many observers have noted that one of al-Qaeda's primary goals is to create a more
Islamic government within Saudi Arabia, and to return the Muslim world generally to adherence to
Islamic principles. In this sense, it is the dissatisfaction of radical Wahhabist elements with their ability
to capture the state that accounts for their terrorist activity. See generally MAMOUN FANDY, SAUDI
ARABIA AND THE POLITICS OF DISSENT (1999); JOSHUA TEITELBAUM, HOLIER THAN THOU: SAUDI
ARABIA'S ISLAMIST RADICALS (2000); Michael Scott Doran, Somebody Else's Civil War: Ideology,
Rage, and the Assault on America, in How DID THIS HAPPEN: TERRORISM AND THE NEW WAR (James
F. Hoge, Jr. & Gideon Rose eds., 2001).
83. Cf. HUNTINGTON, supra note 34.
84. It may sound unusual at first to hear religions described as operating in an anarchic state, since
religions are generally viewed as subordinate to the nation-state. However, both Christianity and Islam
provide people with a primary political identification other than the nation-state. Moreover, both faiths
can themselves challenge the nation-state. Huntington notes that "[i]n the modem world, religion is a
central, perhaps the central, force that motivates and mobilizes people." HUNTINGTON, supra note 34,
at 66. It is common for religious fundamentalists to "believe that loyalty to the religion should
supersede patriotism and that all adherents of their religion should be united politically." ROURKE,
supra note 8, at 183; see also infra note 103 and accompanying text (explaining that many Muslims
believe that the legitimacy of states should be determined by their accordance with Islamic principles).
Nation-states themselves view religions as important international actors. Even a country as powerful
as China sees the growth of religion within its borders as a considerable threat. The head of China's
Religious Affairs Bureau wrote in 1995: "If, with a lapse of attention, [religious issues] are not handled
properly, it may undermine social stability, reform and opening up, and the overall interests of
economic construction." Ye Xiaowen, On the Need to Conscientiously Implement "Three Sentences"
in Carrying out Religion-Related Work Well, RENMIN RIBAO, at 9 (quoted in SHEA, supra note 13, at
66).
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2. Spheres of Influence as a Strategy
States utilize spheres of influence as one strategy in the pursuit of power or
security. They define, defend, and enlarge their own spheres of influence while
attempting to undermine the spheres of other states. In other words, great powers
seek to dominate their own geographic regions of the world and also seek to
prevent other states from gaining a foothold.
Likewise, many Christians and Muslims think that their faiths dominate and
are able to exert a large amount of influence over particular geographic regions.
As explained above, these believers' views tend to mirror those held by realists, as
they believe that Christianity and Islam are competitors intentionally and that one
faith's gain is the other's loss.85 Thus, adherents to both religions attempt to
pressure states within their perceived spheres of influence to adopt policies that
advance their faith, and also undertake independent actions to preserve and expand
their religion's sphere of influence (for example, proselytism).
The spheres of influence concept contains both descriptive and predictive
power for analyzing the interactions between Islam and Christianity. We should
expect, now and in the future, to see both Christians and Muslims acting to define,
defend, and enlarge their faiths' spheres of influence.
III. ISLAM
86
Islam, which means "submission" in Arabic,8 7 is the world's second largest
religion, after Christianity."8 Muslims believe in a supreme being, Allah.8 9 Islam
teaches that Allah delivered a series of prophets to all the people of the earth. All
of these prophets brought the same message, enjoining submission to Allah's will.
However, Muslims believe that, over time, the message that these prophets
85. See supra Part II.A.I.
86. This Part utilizes a large number of Arabic terms to denote Islamic concepts related to the
maintenance and expansion of the Muslim sphere of influence. Thus, it is worth noting that
"transliteration of Arabic is an imprecise art." Thomas A. Geraci, Book Review, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
754, 757 (1999) (reviewing MAJID KHADDURI & EDMUND GHAREEB, WAR IN THE GULF 1990-1991:
THE IRAQ-KUWAIT CONFLICT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (1997)). "[B]ecause there is no standard method
of transliteration from Arabic to English, there are numerous ways to spell certain key words relevant to
a discourse on Islam." Lindsey E. Blenkhom, Note, Islamic Marriage Contracts in American Courts:
Interpreting Mahr Agreements as Prenuptials and Their Effect on Muslim Women, 76 S. CAL. L. REV.
189, 192 n.15 (2002). The spelling of Arabic terms employed in this article may differ from the
spellings employed by other authors.
87. To Muslims, the word signifies "complete submission to the will of Allah." Irshad Abdal-
Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origin and Elements, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 27,41 (2002);
see also M. Ozonnia Ojielo, Human Rights and Sharia'h Justice in Nigeria, 9 ANN. SURV. INT'L &
Comp. L. 135, 144 (2003). Because "Islam" is derived from the root word "salam," or peace, some
writers also claim that Islam "stands for and means peace." A.A. MAUDUDI, TOWARDS
UNDERSTANDING IsLAM 2 (no date given).
88. See Mark O'Keefe, 2 Christian Organizations Are Ready to Convert Iraqis; Missionaries Set
to Tend to Physical, Spiritual Needs, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 27, 2003, at A49; Nick Papadopoulos,
Islam in Asia; A Roundup of Issues Facing the Region's Estimated 670 Million Muslims, TIME INT'L,
Mar. 10, 2003, at 24.
89. "Allah" is Arabic for God. While the two terms can be used interchangeably, this article
employs the term Allah when referring to the Islamic deity.
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conveyed has been either lost or distorted.90 In particular, the Islamic faith holds
that both the Old Testament and New Testament represent genuine revelations
from Allah, but that the message of these books has become corrupted over time.
Muslims believe that the only scripture that remains uncorrupted today is the
Qur'an, which Islamic tradition holds that Allah revealed to the prophet
Muhammad ibn Abdullah through the Angel Gabriel from a period of
approximately 610 AD through 632 AD, the year of the prophet's death.9'
Islam's thoroughly monotheistic outlook is summarized in the Qur'an: "Say:
He is Allah, the One and Only; Allah, the Eternal, Absolute; He begetteth not, nor
is He begotten; and there is none like unto Him. 92
The Qur'an teaches that there will eventually be a Day of Judgment, on which
the dead will be raised and either rewarded with heaven or punished with the
hellfire by their Creator.93  In Islamic theology, whether an individual attains
salvation is based both upon faith and works. At present, a debate exists among
Muslims over whether non-Muslims may reach heaven. Those who believe that
heaven is open to non-Muslims point to a Qur'anic ayah (verse) which states,
"Those who believe (in the Qur'an), and those who follow the Jewish (scriptures),
and the Christians and the Sabians-any who believe in Allah and the Last Day,
and work righteousness, shall have their reward with the Lord; on them shall be no
fear, nor shall they grieve. 94 Muslims who believe that only adherents to the
Islamic faith can attain salvation contend that the foregoing ayah was later
abrogated by a different Qur'anic ayah, which states: "[W]hoever seeks a religion
other than Islam, it will never be accepted of him, and in the Hereafter he will be
one of the losers."95 But regardless of whether they believe that adherents to other
90. HAMMUDAH ABDALATI, ISLAM IN Focus 12 (3d ed. 1997).
91. ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION 12-13 (1990); ABDUR
RAHMAN I. Doi, SHARI'AH: THE ISLAMIC LAw 21 (1984).
92. THE MEANING OF THE HOLY QUR'AN 112:1-4 (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans., 7th ed. 1995)
[hereinafter HQ]. In addition to Yusuf Ali's translation, when it is necessary to illustrate more
conservative Islamic thought, this article relies upon a translation of the Qur'an that is steeped in
Wahhabi theology, INTERPRETATION OF THE MEANINGS OF THE NOBLE QUR'AN (Muhammad Taqi-ud-
Din AI-Hilali & Muhammad Muhsin Khan trans., 15th ed. 1996) [hereinafter NQ]. For background on
Wahhabism, see, e.g., GOLD, supra note 7; Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Culture of Ugliness in Modern
Islam and Reengaging Morality, 2 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 33, 68-90 (2002-2003).
93. HQ, supra note 92, 2:177, 30:40.
94. Id. at 2:62. For examples of Muslims who use this verse to argue that some non-Muslims may
attain salvation in the afterlife, see, e.g., Ali S. Asani, "So That You May Know One Another": A
Muslim American Reflects on Pluralism and Islam, 588 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 40, 44-
45 (2003); Farid Esack, Muslims Engaging the Other and the Humanum, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 529,
555-56 (2000).
95. NQ, supra note 92, 3:85. AI-Hilali and Khan's translation can be contrasted with Mohammad
Pickthall's. Pickthall translates ayah 3:85 as follows: "And whoso seeketh as religion other than the
Surrender (to Allah) it will not be accepted from him, and he will be a loser in the Hereafter." THE
GLORIOUS QUR'AN: TEXT AND EXPLANATORY TRANSLATION 3:85 (Mohammad M. Pickthall trans., no
date given) [hereinafter GQ]. Pickthall's translation of the word "Islam" as "Surrender" suggests-
consonant with ayah 2:62-that non-Muslims who are faithful to their own religions may properly
surrender to Allah's will, and thus attain salvation. It is difficult to determine which meaning Yusuf Ali
attributes to ayah 3:85, as his translation is mired in ambiguity: "If anyone desires a religion other than
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faiths can attain salvation, all Muslims agree that they follow the only uncorrupted
scripture, and hence the only faith that is truly in accordance with Allah's will.
Thus, virtually all Muslims agree that their religion demands that they call others
to Islam.96
Islam constitutes "a complete way of life: a religion, an ethic, and a legal
system all in one.'  The guidelines that Islamic scholars have derived from the
Qur'an and Sunnah (the sayings and traditions of Muhammad) are quite extensive,
and can reach virtually every aspect of a believer's life. For example, in the course
of a single book, a prominent Saudi religious scholar decreed, among many other
things, that growing a beard is obligatory for Muslim men,98 that Muslims should
not listen to music or songs,99 that men should not hold their wives' hands outside
the home, °° and that "[h]andclapping and whistling are abominable acts which one
should abandon."'' While these rulings by no means represent consensus views
among Islamic scholars, they provide some indication of how far-reaching Islam's
strictures can be. The system of Islamic law that is derived from the Qur'an and
Islam (submission to Allah), never will it be accepted of him; and in the Hereafter he will be in the
ranks of those who have lost (all spiritual good)." HQ, supra note 92, 3:85. Yusuf Ali translates the
word "Islam" literally, but his parenthetical clarification that Islam signifies "submission to Allah"
leaves room for Pickthall's more liberal interpretation. In no way does Yusuf Ali's explanatory
footnote clarify the point:
The Muslim position is clear: The Muslim does not claim to have a religion peculiar to
himself. Islam is not a sect or an ethnic religion. In its view all Religion is one, for the
Truth is one. It was the religion preached by all the earlier prophets. It was the truth
taught by all the inspired Books. In essence it amounts to a consciousness of the Will and
Plan of Allah and a joyful submission to that Will and Plan. If anyone wants a religion
other than that, he is false to his own nature, as he is false to Allah's Will and Plan. Such
a one cannot expect guidance, for he has deliberately renounced guidance.
Id. at 150 n.418. Yusuf Ali's statement simultaneously implies both that spiritual truth can be found in
faiths other than Islam because "all Religion is one, for the Truth is one," and also that those people
who reject the "Will and Plan of Allah" and stubbornly adhere to non-Islamic faiths are "false to
Allah's Will and Plan," and thus have "deliberately renounced guidance."
96. See Ali Khan, Islam as Intellectual Property: "My Lord! Increase Me in Knowledge", 31
CuMB. L. REv. 631, 669-73 (2001-2002) (outlining the principle of invitation in Islam); see also infra
Parts III.A.4, III.B.3.
97. J.N.D. ANDERSON, ISLAMIC LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD ix (1975); see also MUHAMMAD
BIN JAMIL ZNO, ISLAMIC GUIDELINES FOR INDIVIDUAL AND SOCLAL REFORM 12-13 (Ibrahim M. Kunna
trans., 1996).
98. ZINO, supra note 97, at 142-43. This view is shared by a large number of Islamic religious
scholars. For example, under the Taliban's rule, men could be imprisoned if their beards were too
short. Editorial, Biting the Hands That Feed Them, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 2001, at N26; Former Taliban
Leader Arrested, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 18, 2003, at A7.
99. ZNo, supra note 97, at 144-46. The Taliban banned music, as well as most other forms of
light entertainment, during its brutal rule in Afghanistan. See Noor Khan, U.S., Afghan Troops Force
Rebel Retreat; Allies Claim Victory After 9-Day Siege, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 4, 2003, at C3. Similarly, the
artist formerly known as Cat Stevens stopped making music for over twenty years after his conversion
to Islam, "believing that music was un-Islamic." Willis Witter, Music in JalalabadAwaits Official OK,
Hits Shaky Note, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2001, at Al.
100. ZINO, supra note 97, at 127-28.
101. Id. at 150.
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the Prophet's example is called shariah.10 2  Many Muslims hold that those
governments that do not rule according to the principles of shariah are
illegitimate. 103
Since the shariah's inception, many Muslims have viewed it as both
codifying an Islamic sphere of influence and providing mechanisms for the
expansion of this sphere. Muslims have sought to protect this perceived sphere of
influence against competition from other religions, secularism, and rival Islamic
sects. This Part first discusses the doctrinal origins and historical usage of the
Islamic sphere of influence, and then discusses how the Islamic sphere of influence
is preserved and expanded today. Because a number of histories of Islam are
available, 1°4 I do not attempt to comprehensively outline the history of the faith.
Instead, my more narrow focus is on the perception that an Islamic sphere of
influence exists.
A. Doctrinal Origins and Historical Usage of the Islamic Sphere of Influence
Since the time of Muhammad, the Islamic faith has been tied to the state.
During his lifetime, Muhammad came to serve as the head of a powerful state. As
a ruler, he outlined a number of principles that established an Islamic sphere of
influence. Based on Muhammad's teachings, Islamic scholars have long divided
into the world into two spheres: the dar al-Harb ("home of war") and the dar al-
Islam ("homestead of Islam"). 10 5 Since the inception of this concept, it has
informed the Islamic view of international law by conceptually dividing those
lands that are consecrated to Islam from the lands that are dominated by
102. Technically, the law that is derived by man is calledfiqh, whereas the ideal law (which man
may not be able to discern completely) is shariah. However, this article generically refers to attempts
to implement Islamic law as shariah, because that is the sense in which the term is popularly
understood.
103. See ABU AMEENAH BILAL PHILIPS, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF TAWHEED (ISLAMIC
MONOTHEISM) 26 (1990) ("The acceptance of non-Islamic rule in place of Sharee 'ah in Muslim lands
is Shirk [polytheism] and an act of Kufr [disbelief] .... [U]n-Islamic government must be sincerely
hated and despised for the pleasure of God and the upholding of Tawheed [Islamic monotheism]."); see
also KAREN ARMSTRONG, ISLAM: A SHORT HISTORY 169 (2000), for a description of the views of
Sayyid Qutb; Clark Benner Lombardi, Note, Islamic Law as a Source of Constitutional Law in Egypt:
The Constitutionalization of the Sharia in a Modern Arab State, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 81, 96
(1998) (describing Qutb as "extremely influential").
104. For general histories of Islam, see ARMSTRONG, supra note 103; JONATHAN BLOOM & SHEILA
BLAIR, ISLAM: A THOUSAND YEARS OF FAITH AND POWER (2000); JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAM: THE
STRAIGHT PATH (3d ed. 1998). For histories of Shiite Islam, see generally SAID AMIR ARJOMAND, THE
SHADOW OF GOD AND THE HIDDEN IMAM: RELIGION, POLITICAL ORDER, AND SOCIETAL CHANGE IN
SHI'ITE IRAN FROM THE BEGINNING TO 1890 (1984); MOOJAN MOMEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO SHI'I
ISLAM (1985). For biographies of Muhammad, see generally MICHAEL COOK, MUHAMMAD (1983);
MARTIN LINGS, MUHAMMAD: HIS LIFE BASED ON THE EARLIEST SOURCES (1983); W. MONTGOMERY
WATT, MUHAMMAD: PROPHET AND STATESMAN (1961). For histories of the Arab world, see generally
ALBERT HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES (1991); PETER MANSFIELD, A HISTORY OF THE
MIDDLE EAST (1991).
105. For an explanation of the concepts of dar al-Harb and dar al-Islam, see Father David-Maria
A. Jaeger, The Fundamental Agreement Between the Holy See and the State of Israel: A New Legal
Regime of Church-State Relations, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 427, 430 (1998). This concept is discussed at
length in Part III.A.1, infra.
VOL. 33:2
No OTHER GODS BEFORE ME
unbelievers.
Muhammad's pronouncements continue to inform and even dictate Muslims'
views on proper Islamic governance and on the relations between their religion and
other faiths. This is because, in Muslims' view, Muhammad received revelations
directly from Allah, and the manner in which Muhammad governed was divinely
inspired. Muslims believe Muhammad to be the perfect man of his generation.
10 6
Thus, many Muslims will carefully pore over the Qur'an and hadith (reports on the
sayings and traditions of Muhammad) before formulating their views on any given
subject.10 7 Most Muslims are especially attentive to Muhammad's views on
political matters.
The linkage between the Islamic faith and the state continued, and even
intensified, following Muhammad's death. One commentator has explained that
the faith went through "several stages during its development, evolving from a
mere city-state (the Medinan period, A.D. 622-32), into a young empire (632-750),
and then into an aspiring world hegemon (750-c.900)."' ' Eventually the West's
political, military, and economic strength came to surpass that of the Islamic
world, and Islam experienced "a period of decentralization (c.900-c.1500), and a
period of outright fragmentation. ' 1° 9 However, throughout these divergent stages
of Islam's history--even while most of the Muslim world was colonized by the
European powers-Muslims continued to perceive a linkage between their faith
and the state, and continued to believe that Islam possessed a geographical sphere
of influence.
A number of mechanisms have been relied upon historically to preserve and
expand this sphere of influence. This section first discusses the concepts of dar al-
Harb and dar al-Islam, which provide the theological justification for the
maintenance and expansion of an Islamic sphere of influence. It then discusses
three major tactics that Muslims have used to both preserve and expand the dar al-
Islam: jihad (military force), the imposition of shariah law, and spreading the faith
through da 'wah (Islamic proselytism).
1. Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam
The central theological concept that defines the Islamic sphere of influence is
the notion that the world is divided into the dar al-Harb and the dar al-Islam. "In
the classical view, the term Dar al-Islam describes those places in the world where
the Shari'ah, the corpus of Islamic law, prevails and is enforced."'1t0 In this view,
the rest of the world, "except those places where a peace treaty with the Muslims is
in place," is considered a part of the dar al-Harb."' The rationale for the
106. KAREN ARMSTRONG, A HISTORY OF GOD 238 (1993).
107. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text for examples of the broad scope that Islamic
religious decrees can have.
108. Christopher A. Ford, Siyar-ization and its Discontents: International Law and Islam's
Constitutional Crisis, 30 TEx. INT'L L.J. 499,513 (1995).
109. Id.
110. Bernard K. Freamon, Martyrdom, Suicide, and the Islamic Law of War: A Short Legal
History, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 299, 300 n.6 (2003).
111. Id.; see also Khan, supra note 7, at 323, which notes that the dar al-Harb is comprised of
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distinction between the dar al-Islam and the dar al-Harb "is that those living
within the realm of believers exist on a significantly advantageous religious plane
compared to those who do not. Consequently, there is a constant political and
religious preoccupation with trying to make the world more advantageous for
Muslims. ' 112 Classical Islamic jurists generally believed that the dar al-Harb was
only temporarily outside Islamic rule, and was "yet to make its submission."'
1 3
Classical jurists thus viewed the world as "a battleground" between these two
separate spheres.' 14 The classical jurists would authorize jihad to either extend or
protect the dar al-Islam, but only if there was "a reasonable prospect of
success."
115
Other implications that these jurists derived from the division of the world
into dar al-Islam and dar al-Harb illustrate the stark conflict that they perceived
between these two spheres. For example, the classical jurists held that it was "not
possible for a Muslim to live a good Muslim life in an infidel land."'1 6 Those non-
believers who saw the light and became Muslim, as well as Muslims who resided
in a formerly Islamic country that was conquered by infidels (for example, those
who lived in Spain immediately following the reconquista), were required to
emigrate from the non-Muslim country where they lived to the dar al-Islam." 
7
The dar al-Harb-dar al-Islam distinction clearly endorses the view that the
world is divided into religious spheres of influence. Most of the strategies for the
faith's expansion that have been codified in Islamic jurisprudence flow from the
division of the world into dar al-Islam and dar al-Harb. This article now turns to
an examination of such strategies.
2. Jihad
Jihad is currently a very controversial concept in the West. While fihad is
Arabic for "struggle," the word is often translated as "holy war.'" 8 Some recent
lands that are "dominated by unbelievers."
112. Khan, supra note 7, at 324.
113. Jaeger, supra note 105, at 430; but see HILMI M. ZAWATI, IS JIHAD A JUST WAR?: WAR,
PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER ISLAMIC AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (2001)
("[T]erritory can be considered dar al-Islam even if it is not under Muslim rule as long as a Muslim can
reside there in safety and freely fulfill his religious obligations.").
114. Donna E. Arzt, The Role of Compulsion in Islamic Conversion: Jihad, Dhimma and Ridda, 8
BUFF. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 15, 22 (2002).
115. CYRIL GLASSE, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 209-10 (1989); cf supra note 51 and
accompanying text. However, some jurisprudential schools held that jihad should only be invoked
defensively. "Early scholars such as Abu Hanifa and Shaybani, who stressed tolerance toward non-
believers, 'made no explicit declarations that the jihad was a war to be waged against non-Muslims
solely on the grounds of disbelief.' Arzt, supra note 114, at 22; cf supra notes 47-48 and
accompanying text.
116. BERNARD LEWIS, WHAT WENT WRONG?: THE CLASH BETWEEN ISLAM AND MODERNITY IN
THE MIDDLE EAST 36 (2002).
117. Id.
118. See Ford, supra note 108, at 502; J.M.B. Porter, Osama bin-Laden, Jihad, and the Sources of
International Terrorism, 13 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 871, 872 (2003); Frank Vogel, Book Review,
83 AM. J. INT'L L. 227, 227 (1989) (reviewing HASAN MOINUDDIN, THE CHARTER OF THE ISLAMIC
CONFERENCE AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AMONG ITS MEMBER STATES
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scholarship has been quite critical of both the concept ofjihad and also the manner
in which jihad has been carried out against non-Muslim lands." 9 On the other
hand, some authors insist that "holy war" is a mistranslation, and thatjihad is a far
less militant concept than the West fears.'
20
However, a powerful interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah exists which
holds that believers are obligated to fight for Allah's cause (which, for some
Muslims, includes wars of expansion designed to establish states governed by the
shariah). In assessing the manner in which some Muslims perceive an Islamic
sphere of influence, it is important to understand this interpretation of jihad.
Sheikh bin Humaid, the former Chief Justice of Saudi Arabia, has authored a
widely distributed essay that forcefully advances this view.' 21 In it, Chief Justice
bin Humaid concisely outlines his view of the three historical phases of jihad in
Islamic jurisprudence: "[A]t first 'the fighting' was forbidden, then it was
permitted, and after that it was made obligatory-(l) against them who start 'the
fighting' against you (Muslims)... (2) and against all those who worship others
along with Allah.'
122
Chief Justice bin Humaid's assertion that armed jihad was originally
forbidden refers to the early part of Muhammad's prophethood, when Muhammad
and his followers lacked political and military strength. During this period, when
Muhammad's followers encountered persecution at the hands of the powerful tribe
of Qureysh in Mecca, their faith prevented them from responding militarily.
Rather than fighting the Qureysh, Muhammad and his followers fled from Mecca
to Medina.
23
After the Muslims relocated to Medina, they gained in political and military
strength. Thereafter, Muslims believe that Muhammad received further revelations
permitting fighting against the Qureysh. It is upon these later ayat (verses) that
Chief Justice bin Humaid bases his argument that jihad was later made permissible
for believers. Surah 22, ayah 39 states: "Permission to fight (against disbelievers)
is given to those (believers) who are fought against, because they have been
wronged; and surely, Allah is Able to give them (believers) victory."' 24 The next
(1987)).
119. See, e.g., PAUL FREGOSI, JIHAD IN THE WEST: MUSLIM CONQUESTS FROM THE 7TH TO THE 21ST
CENTURIES (1998); SPENCER, supra note 1.
120. See, e.g., Anthony Day, Morality, War: Do They Mix?; As Americans Search Their Souls for
Answers, Some Religious Leaders Question Whether There Can Ever be a 'Just War' When Modern
Warfare Can be So Terribly Destructive, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 15, 1991, at Al (quoting Maher Hathout);
Hussein S. Elkhansa, What We Believe: Understanding Islam, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W. Va.), May
7, 2000, at 4C; Raheel Raza, Pilgrimage a Time to Pray for the Blessing of Peace, TORONTO STAR,
May 11, 1995, at A29. See also infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text (explaining non-military
meanings of jihad).
121. Sheikh 'Abdullah bin Muhammad bin Humaid, The Call to Jihad (Holy Fighting in Allah's
Cause) in the Qur 'an, reprinted in NQ, supra note 92, at 1224.
122. Id. at 1227.
123. This flight, known as the Hijra, also marks the beginning of the Islamic calendar. See Abdal-
Haqq, supra note 87, at 37 n.45; M. Cherif Bassiouni & Gamal M. Badr, The Shariah: Sources,
Interpretation, and Rule-Making, I UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 135, 139 n.6 (2002).
124. NQ, supra note 92, 22:39.
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ayah states that fighting is also permitted for "[t]hose who have been expelled
from their homes unjustly only because they said: 'Our Lord is Allah.' 12 5 Thus,
after these verses were revealed, fighting against unbelievers was permitted for
Muslims who were either fought against by unbelievers or who had been expelled
from their homes because of their adherence to Islam.
Finally, Chief Justice bin Humaid argues that jihad was eventually made
obligatory for all Muslims, and that the previous strictures delimiting the
conditions for battle against unbelievers were broadened. He points to two
Qur'anic verses that were revealed late in Muhammad's life. The first enjoins
Muslims to "fight in the Way of Allah those who fight you. ' 126 And ayah 9:29
states:
Fight against those who (1) believe not in Allah, (2) nor in the Last Day, (3) nor
forbid that which has been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger... (4) and
those who acknowledge not the religion of truth (i.e. Islam) among the people of
the Scripture (Jews and Christians), until they pay the Jizyah with willing
submission, and feel themselves subdued.'
27
The language employed by these two later ayat is markedly different from
that employed in Surah 22, where Chief Justice bin Humaid argues that "'the
fighting'... was permitted," but not made obligatory.1 28 The two ayat from Surah
22 use permissive language indicating the circumstances in which believers may
fight against unbelievers. In contrast, the two later ayat are written in the
imperative tense. According to Chief Justice bin Humaid, this difference in
language indicates that believers do not simply have the option to fight against
unbelievers when the requisite circumstances have been satisfied. Rather, he
argues that Muslims have the affirmative duty to engage in jihad against
unbelievers when the unbelievers fight against them (ayah 2:190), and when
unbelievers refuse to believe in Allah and the Last Day, accept Islamic shariah,
and pay the jizya (ayah 9:29).129 Hence, Chief Justice bin Humaid implores his
readers: "Jihad is a great deed indeed and there is no deed whose reward or
blessing is as that of it, and for this reason, it is the best thing that one can
volunteer for.",
130
These verses have also led other Muslim ideologues to conclude that Islamic
wars of expansion fall squarely within the believer's obligation to participate in
jihad. Sayyid Qutb, for example, concluded from ayah 9:29 "that waging jihad
against the People of the Book (Jews and Christians) is a permanent, communal
125. Id. 22:40.
126. Id. 2:190. The reason that a verse revealed late in Muhammad's prophethood is found in the
second Surah is that the Qur'an is not arranged chronologically. The codified text's only organizational
system is placing the longest surahs before the shortest. See I MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI,
PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 343, 353 (1997).
127. NQ, supra note 92, 9:29.
128. Bin Humaid, supra note 121, at 1227.
129. For a description of thejizya, see infra Part II.A.3.
130. Bin Humaid, supra note 121, at 1233.
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obligation upon the Muslims."
'13
Not all Muslims share this militant exegesis. A recent book by Hilmi M.
Zawati, for example, argues that "jihad is a just, defensive, and exceptional form of
warfare geared... to secure justice and equality among all people.' 32  Other
commentators de-emphasize the military meaning of jihad, and point out that
"[j]ihad can be accomplished by '[t]he heart, the tongue, and the hands, as well as
the sword."" 133  Similarly, Imam Muhammad Armiya Nu'Man has stated that
"[j]ihad... deals with the struggles within yourself, more than war with others."'
' 34
Imam Nu'Man's statement is based on a distinction that some scholars make
between "lesser jihad," or religious warfare, and "greater jihad," which is "the
warfare in oneself against any evil or temptation."' 35 This distinction between
greater and lesserjihad derives from a hadith in which Muhammad observed as he
and his followers were returning from a battle: "We return from the lesser jihad to
the greater jihad.' 36 The hadith implies that the struggle for one's soul is more
difficult and more important than struggles on the battlefield.
While there is some controversy on this point,1 37 it appears that after
Muhammad's death, the early Muslim leadership shared Chief Justice bin
Humaid's view that one important purpose offihad was expansion of the dar al-
Islam. In his history of Christianity, Brian Moynahan comprehensively outlines
the progress of the Muslim wars of expansion. He explains that "[t]he early
campaigns were aimed at winning complete control of Arabia and dominance over
the nomadic tribes on its Iraqi and Syrian borders."' 138 Thereafter, the Muslims
pressed westward. The resulting military confrontations represent the first Islamic
intrusion into the Christian sphere of influence. Islamic armies succeeded in
conquering such formerly Christian lands as Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and North
131. Sherman A. Jackson, Jihad in the Modern World: To 'Abd al-Karim Salabuddin, J. ISLAMIC
L. & CULTURE 1, 22-24 (2002).
132. ZAWATI, supra note 113, at 4. For two compelling critiques of Zawati's book, see generally
Nishita Doshi, Book Note, 38 STAN. J INT'L L. 319 (2002) (reviewing ZAWATI, supra note 113); Mairaj
U. Syed, Book Note, Islamic Law and the Apologetics of Jihad: A Review of Is Jihad a Just War?, 2
UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 155 (2002-2003).
133. Andrew Paine, Note, Religious Fundamentalism and Legal Systems: Methods and Rationales
in the Fight to Control the Political Apparatus, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 263, 280 (1997) (quoting
Ford, supra note 108, at 502); see also Aliya Haider, The Rhetoric of Resistance: Islamism, Modernity,
and Globalization, 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 91, 118-19 (2002) (arguing that "holy war" is a
mistranslation that "reveals a critical misunderstanding of what is going on 'over there' in the so-called
hotbeds of Islamist unrest"); Lance S. Lehnhof, Freedom of Religious Association: The Right of
Religious Organizations to Obtain Legal Entity Status Under the European Convention, 2002 BYU L.
REV. 561, 575 (2002) ("The most common definition of jihad is a struggle, usually a struggle for
justice, righteousness, or a better way of life.").
134. IMAM MUHAMMAD ARMYA NU'MAN, WHAT EVERY AMERICAN SHOULD KNOW ABOUT
ISLAM & THE MUSLIMS 17 (1985).
135. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF WORLD RELIGIONS 501 (John Bowker ed., 1997).
136. See JOHN L. ESPOSITO, UNHOLY WAR: TERROR IN THE NAME OF ISLAM 28 (2002). This
hadith is regarded by Muslim scholars as "weak," or of questionable authenticity.
137. For a dissenting view, see ARMSTRONG, supra note 103, at 29.
138. BRIAN MOYNAHAN, THE FAITH: A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY 162 (2002).
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Africa.
1 39
One factor aiding this conquest was the fact that the Christian world was at
the time deeply divided over questions of Christology, and this division often led
the Christian state to brutally impose orthodoxy upon its subjects. 140 Because of
this repression, many Eastern Christians actually celebrated when Muslim armies
arrived because they believed that Muslim control would free them from the
persecution they had endured for their beliefs under Roman rule. 141 The Muslim
armies were perceived as tolerant because they did not initially destroy churches,
nor did they become involved in Christian theological quarrels. In fact, this
projected tolerance may have been another tool to help expand the Muslim sphere
of influence. Moynahan suggests that the Islamic "victories came from deep
insight as much as military brilliance," as the Muslim conquerors successfully
"used toleration and taxation as weapons, the first to secure easy surrender, the
second to finance further conquest and swell their numbers by stimulating"
conversion to Islam.1
42
After conquering the Middle East and North Africa in the seventh century,
Muslim armies gained a foothold in Europe in the eighth century. Using North
Africa as a launching point, they conquered Spain and Portugal, and invaded
France.43 "[I1n the ninth century they conquered Sicily and invaded the Italian
mainland."' 144 Centuries later, Muslim armies also swept through eastern Europe.
In fact, it was the Turkish threat that prompted Byzantine emperor Alexius
Comnenus I to appeal to Rome for military help, thus prompting the Crusades.
145
Thereafter, Muslim forces managed to overrun the Balkan peninsula, Bulgaria,
Hungary, and even Constantinople.
146
Although Muslim forces-in the form of the Ottomans-continued to be a
major power in Europe until late in the seventeenth century, the West gained in
political, military, and economic strength, and eventually came to far outstrip the
Islamic world's power.147 Today, Islamic states themselves pose little military
threat to the West. Instead, the biggest military threats emanating from the Muslim
world are terrorist cells and small, dedicated groups of holy warriors (mujahideen)
who engage in armed combat throughout the globe.
148
3. The Imposition of Shariah Law
When Muslim armies conquered non-Muslim lands, they would establish a
new government ruled by shariah law. There was both an offensive and defensive
139. LEWIS, supra note 116, at 4.
140. These controversies concerning questions of Christology, and the resultant state repression,
are discussed in infra Part IV.A.
141. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 157-58.
142. Id. at 159. The system of taxation that Moynahan mentions is discussed in infra Part III.A.3.
143. LEWIS, supra note 116, at 4.
144. Id.
145. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 103, at 95.
146. Id. at 109-11.
147. See LEWIS, supra note 116, at 16-17.
148. See infra Part 1II.B. 1.
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aspect to the manner in which shariah law bolstered the Islamic sphere of
influence. Offensively, it provided material incentives for non-Muslims to convert
to Islam. Defensively, the shariah politically disempowered non-Muslims, thus
preventing them from gaining strength.
The implementation of shariah law ensured that non-Muslims "became
inferior subjects, and visibly so.' 49 The treatment of non-Muslims under Islamic
rule depended on whether they were characterized as "People of the Book," whose
faith was based on what Muslims believed to be revealed (albeit corrupted)
scriptures150 Under shariah law, Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and Sabians
generally were considered People of the Book. 5' When Muslims conquered the
cities of People of the Book, they would present the inhabitants with the choice of
either continuing to adhere to their old faith or embracing Islam. Those who
retained their own faith were characterized as dhimmis (people under contract or
guarantee from the Islamic state). 5 2 Under the shariah, dhimmis were largely free
to practice their religion, and were free from pressure to convert under threat of
force. Other freedoms that dhimmis enjoyed "included protection from desecration
of their holy sites and autonomy in appointment of religious leaders, as well as
juridical autonomy in civil matters and equality with Muslims of punishment and
restitution in criminal matters."'5
3
Despite these freedoms, shariah law provided a number of material incentives
for dhimmis to convert to Islam, and ensured that dhimmis remained politically
disempowered. Dhimmis were forced to pay the jizya (poll tax) and also land
taxes. 154 The jizya served as a financial incentive for dhimmis to embrace Islam,
and Muslim citizens independently attempted to propagate their faith among the
dhimmis through da'wah.15 However, this process of conversion worked in one
direction only: Shariah law prohibited dhimmis from attempting to convert
Muslims to their religion.1 56  Any illicit attempts at proselytism that dhimmis
149. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 171.
150. Carolyn Ratner, Book Review, 18 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 137, 151 (1998) (reviewing JUDITH
MILLER, GOD HAS NINETY-NINE NAMES (1996)) (noting that People of the Book were "believers in
other religions which are deemed to have had a heavenly-revealed scripture"); see also Asani, supra
note 94, at 43-44; James David Phipps, Kiss of Death: Application of Title VI's Prohibition Against
Religious Discrimination in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1994 BYU L. REV. 399, 406 (1994).
151. Arzt, supra note 114, at 25; see also Esack, supra note 94, at 546 ("At various times, Hindus,
Buddhists, Zoroastrians, Magians and Sabeans were included among or excluded from the People of the
Book, depending on the theological predilections of the Muslim scholars and, perhaps more
importantly, the geo-political context in which they lived.").
152. For a more extended treatments ofdhimmis, see A.S. TRITTON, THE CALIPHS AND THEIR NON-
MUSLIM SUBJECTS: A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE COVENANT OF UMAR (1970); BAT YE'OR, THE
DHIMMI: JEWS AND CHRISTIANS UNDER ISLAM (David Maisel et al. trans., 1985).
153. Arzt, supra note 114, at 26.
154. Donna E. Arzt, Heroes or Heretics: Religious Dissidents Under Islamic Law, 14 Wis. INT'L
L.J. 349, 380 n.126 (1996); Dr. Moussa Abou Ramadan, The Transition from Tradition to Reform: The
Shari'a Appeals Court Rulings on Child Custody (1992-2001), 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 595, 601 n.30
(2003).
155. Arzt, supra note 114, at 25.
156. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 171.
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engaged in were further frustrated by the fact that virtually all Islamic states
historically imposed anti-apostasy laws on their Muslim citizens, even while non-
Muslims were encouraged to convert to Islam. For approximately twelve
centuries, the penalty for conversion out of Islam was death in most Muslim
states. '57
Moynahan explains that Christian dhimmis typically faced a number of other
legal restrictions under Islamic rule:
They were not allowed to ride horses, a social humiliation and a military
precaution, for it was folly for a horseless person to contemplate revolt. Their
church bells were tolled softly, if at all, lest they offend Moslem ears. No cross
could be displayed in public; neither could a pig nor a glass of wine. No
Christian building could be higher than those of Moslems, no pomp could
accompany a Christian funeral. A Christian was required to respect the Koran
and never speak ill of Islam or Muhammad; he was forbidden to marry or be
intimate with Moslem women.... Provided he kept to these ground rule... the
Christian enjoyed the protection offered to dhimmis. 158
The combination of the jizya, the prohibition on proselytization by dhimmis,
anti-apostasy laws, and the visible social humiliations imposed on dhimmis were a
ringing success in driving Christians to convert to Islam. The fall injizya receipts
in both Mesopotamia and Egypt after Muslim conquests demonstrates the large
number of Christian apostates.15 9
Certain non-Muslims in lands that Muslim armies conquered could not be
categorized as People of the Book. For example, Muslims did not regard
polytheists and idolators as People of the Book.160 Those non-Muslims who were
not classified as People of the Book faced far greater restrictions under Islamic
rule. Unlike dhimmis, they were not given the option of continuing to practice
their own religion. Instead, they were given only three choices: "slavery,
conversion to Islam, or death.''
Not only did the system of shariah law entrench the Islamic sphere of
influence in conquered lands, but it also provided the engine for further expansion.
Moynahan notes that the jizya financed further incursions into Christian territory,
as "[t]he Dome of the Rock... the shimmering mosque soon built on the site of
Solomon's Temple in Jerusalem, was said to have cost seven years' revenue from
conquered Christian Egypt."'
162
157. See ABUL ALA MAWDUDI, THE PUNISHMENT OF THE APOSTATE ACCORDING TO ISLAMIC LAW
17 (Syed Silas Husain & Ernest Hahn trans., 1994).
158. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 171; see also Arzt, supra note 114, at 27 ("Dhimmis ... were
forbidden to ... walk in the middle of the street, to sell their books or religious articles in marketplaces,
to raise their voices during worship .... ").
159. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 166, 181.
160. Arzt, supra note 114, at 27.
161. Id.; see also NQ, supra note 92, 9:5.
162. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 171.
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Thus, the implementation of shariah law has historically served to define a
state as Islamic in character, and to consecrate that state as part of the Muslim
sphere of influence. The shariah would bolster Islam's power within that state by
providing incentives for non-Muslims to convert to Islam and ensuring that non-
Muslims could not threaten the state's Islamic character.
4. Da'wah
Da'wah is the Arabic word that denotes invitation to Islam-essentially,
da 'wah is the equivalent of Christian missionary work. 163 Da 'wah has long been
an important tool for spreading Islam. In fact, Muhammad relied exclusively on
da 'wah to spread the faith during his early years in Mecca, as well as early in his
tenure in Medina.
The most important ayah relating to da 'wah states: "Invite (all) to the Way of
thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching; and argue with them in ways that
are best and most gracious; for thy Lord knoweth best, who have strayed from His
Path, and who receive guidance."' 64  From this verse, Ali Khan divines three
distinct rules governing da'wah. First, he states that da'wah must be "an
invitation, not a forced initiation.'' 65 His pronouncement that invitees must come
to Islam voluntarily is consonant with ayah 2:256, which provides that there shall
be "no compulsion in religion."' 66 Second, Khan finds that "da'wah mandates
wisdom and fair preaching."'167 He states that the invitor "is prohibited from
presenting a distorted or pandering picture" of Islam-for example, by
highlighting only the benefits of the faith without "mentioning the corresponding
obligations."'168 Third, Khan finds that the invitee's ultimate decision regarding
whether to accept Islam lies with Allah: "No human effort, without the will of
God, can succeed in matters of faith.' 69
Furthermore, Khan explains that specific strictures within the Islamic faith
dictate the manner in which da 'wah should be conducted:
Related to da'wah are the manners of discourse that the invitor must observe in
introducing Islam to the invitee. The Shari'a prohibits excessive argumentation
or impolite criticism of others' beliefs. The Quran states rather candidly that
when an invitee begins to ridicule God's message, the invitor must leave the
163. Abdul Rahman I. Doi, Proselytism and Islam in Southern Africa, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
1147, 1147 (2000); Jorgen S. Nielsen, Contemporary Discussions on Religious Minorities in Islam,
2002 BYU L. REv. 353, 366 (2002).
164. HQ, supra note 92, 16:125. Daw'ah is also discussed in ayah 3:64, which states:
Say: "0 People of the Book! come to common terms as between us and you: That we
worship none but Allah; that we associate no partners with Him; that we erect not, from
among ourselves, lords and patrons other than Allah." If then they turn back, say ye:
"Bear witness that we (at least) are Muslims (bowing to Allah's will)."
Id. 3:64.
165. Khan, supra note 96, at 670.
166. HQ, supra note 92, 2:256. For commentary on this verse, see, e.g., Asani, supra note 94, at
45; Mohamed Nimer, Muslims in America After 9-11, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 1, 16 (2002-2003).
167. Khan, supra note 96, at 670.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 671; see also HQ, supra note 92, 10:99-100, 72:21.
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company and not engage in a nasty or hurtful conversation. The Sunna also
prohibits annoying questions in matters of faith. Thus, da'wah is not a contest
for winning an intellectual debate. It is a sincere invitation to Islam, a positive
message that does not vilify other religions.17
0
Da'wah has historically been used not only to convince individuals to
embrace Islam, but also to dramatically expand the perceived Muslim sphere of
influence. One example is Malaysia, where Karen Armstrong writes: "Muslim
merchants, every one a missionary for the faith, had settled... at a time when
Buddhist trade had collapsed there, and soon enjoyed immense prestige. Sufi
preachers followed the businessmen, and by the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries
Malaya was predominantly Muslim." 7 '
B. Contemporary Defense of the Islamic Sphere of Influence
The September 11 attacks revealed and intensified deep schisms within
contemporary Islam. Many Muslims would agree with Islamic scholar Khaled
Abou El Fad] that their co-religionists have, by and large, "lost touch with the
thoughtful, pluralistic, introspective faith of the past.' 72 Even before 9/11, liberal
and reform-minded Muslims had been challenging conservative Islamic
interpretations of the mechanisms used to promote the Islamic sphere of
influence.17 3  The 9/11 attacks helped to provide reformist Muslims with the
impetus they needed; since then, such groups as Free Muslims Against
Terrorism174 have launched bold and comprehensive critiques of the radicalism
within their faith.
Thus, an explosive and crucially important debate is currently occurring
among Muslims about the proper relationship between Islam and the West, and
Islam's compatibility with democracy and modernity. Even the idea that the world
is divided into dar al-Islam and dar al-Harb has come under some attack.1
75
However, the idea that the world is divided into dar al-Harb and dar al-Islam
is far from dead. Most conservative Muslims' conceptions of international affairs
are still shaped by the dar al-Islam-dar al-Harb distinction. And even Muslims
who are inclined to reject this division of the world are uncomfortable with actions
by non-Muslims that would traditionally be regarded as intrusions into the dar al-
Islam, such as the organized missionary efforts that followed the United States'
170. Khan, supra note 96, at 672.
171. ARMSTRONG, supra note 103, at 110.
172. Jane Eisner, Muslims Find a Haven in U.S., PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 4, 2002, LEXIS,
News Library, News Group File.
173. For examples of challenges by liberal Muslims that preceded the September 11 th attacks, see
generally AN-NA'IM, supra note 91, and FAZLUR RAHMAN, ISLAM & MODERNITY: TRANSFORMATION
OF AN INTELLECTUAL TRADITION (1982).
174. The website of Free Muslims Against Terrorism can be found at http://www.freemuslims.org
(last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
175. See, e.g., Khan, supra note 7, at 323-25; Ihsan Yilmaz, The Challenge of Post-Modern
Legality and Muslim Legal Pluralism in England, 28 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUDIES 347 (Apr.
2002) ("[M]ost Muslim community leaders in Europe today regard the concepts of dar al-harb and dar
al-Islam as irrelevant in the present-day context.").
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toppling of both the Taliban and Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime.
176
What will come of the vital struggle for the soul of Islam remains to be seen.
However, at present, the Same mechanisms that historically have been used to
preserve and expand the Islamic sphere of influence are still utilized today. This
section now examines the contemporary use of the mechanisms for strengthening
the dar al-Islam.
1. Jihad
While the Islamic state once engaged in frequent wars of expansion designed
to spread the faith throughout the world, Muslim states do not do so today.
177
Today, small but dedicated groups of Islamic warriors who have been engaged in
combat throughout the globe since long before 9/11 have taken up the mantle of
radical jihad.
Al-Qaeda is one such group, but many others exist. In general, these groups
share the common goal of toppling secular governments and replacing them with
Islamic regimes. For example, in the Philippines, the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), a group that claims up to 12,000 guerillas, has been fighting to
establish an Islamic state for twenty-five years.178 It has been reported that "[u]ntil
Philippine troops in 2000 overran [MILF's] major training base, Camp Abu Bakar,
the facility served as a kind of mini-Afghanistan, training militants from across
Southeast Asia.' 79  MILF is joined in the Philippines by Abu Sayyaf, another
insurgent Filipino group that "purports to have an Islamist agenda but has
descended into criminal gangs of kidnappers and thieves."' 80 Abu Sayyaf gained
notoriety in 2001 when it kidnapped American missionary couple Gracia and
Martin Burnham.'
81
176. See Muzaffar, supra note 4.
177. This fact may not represent an ideological shift so much as it reflects Muslim states' military
weakness vis-A-vis the West. For example, with its weak military, see Michael Levi, Royal Pain, NEW
REPUBLIC, June 2, 2003, at 14, Saudi Arabia would be hard pressed to fight a war of expansion.
Nonetheless, Islamic charities financed by the Saudi regime have actively propagated the notion that
Muslims have a duty to engage in jihad for the purpose of expanding the dar al-Islam. See generally
GOLD, supra note 7.
178. See David E. Kaplan et al., The Shadow Over the Summit, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 20,
2003, at 29; Philippines President Says al-Ghozi Shot Dead, a "Warning to Terrorists," AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 13, 2003, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
179. Kaplan et al., supra note 178, at 29.
180. Id. In a similar vein, the Korea Herald described Abu Sayyaf as "little more than a criminal
gang specializing in kidnappings and beheadings, with only tangential connections to international
terrorism." Powell's Visit to Southeast Asia at Crucial Time, KOREA HERALD, July 24, 2002, at
LEXIS, News Library, News Group File. Regardless of the questionable strength of Abu Sayafs
present connections to terrorism, its terrorist links in the mid-1990s are indisputable. Peter Bergen
explains that in 1994 Islamist militants "collaborated with Abu Sayyaf ... on a plan to blow up eleven
passenger jets and to assassinate Pope John Paul I1 on his visit to the Philippines." PETER L. BERGEN,
HOLY WAR, INC.: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF OSAMA BIN LADEN 222 (2001). These plots were
discovered when authorities seized 1993 World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef's laptop computer
after a failed explosives experiment in his Manila apartment. Id.
181. Philippines Loses 300,000 Dlrs in Failed "Sting" of Abu Sayyaf Kidnappers, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 23, 2003, News Library, News Group File, Martin Burnham was killed in a
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Another prominent example of these contemporary holy warriors can be seen
in the current conflict in Chechnya. The Chechens originally battled Russia in a
war of independence between 1994 and 1996.182 "Islam became a rallying cry in
Chechnya's 1994-95 war for independence, but was not a driving force."'
8 3
However, after Chechen military victories in that war earned them de facto
independence, the conservative Wahhabi sect gained political power in Chechnya.
In early 1999, Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov was pressured to introduce
shariah law.'8 4 Later that year, a series of apartment bombings in Russia were
blamed on Islamist militants, and a Chechen warlord twice invaded the Russian
province of Dagestan in an attempt to establish an Islamic state.' 8 5  The
combination of the bombings and attacks on Dagestan caused Russian troops to
reenter the region, thus igniting the current Chechen conflict.
The Chechen conflict illustrates the linkages between international jihadist
groups. Few international Islamists were involved in Chechnya's 1994-96 war of
independence; most of the international Islamists who signed on did so as a result
of the Russian military's brutality in pursuing the campaign.8 6 However, when
new hostilities broke out between Russia and the Chechens in 1999, the casus belli
was an attempt to establish an Islamic state, a goal that resonated with international
jihadist groups. Hence, Chechnya experienced a "massive influx of foreigners that
one could reasonably call terrorists from Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and other
Middle Eastern states."' 8 7 These foreign fighters came to comprise an important
part of the Chechen rebels' forces.
rescue attempt on June 7, 2002. Id.; see also Bruce Finley, Kidnapping a Growth Industry: Abduction
Now a Tool of Terror, DENVER POST, July 6, 2003, at Al.
182. See Islamic Court in Chechnya Suspends Parliament, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 25,
1998, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File; Henry Meyer, New Chechen President Vows "Even
Harsher" Crackdown on Rebels, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 7, 2003, LEXIS, News Library, News
Group File; Fred Weir, Putin Links Chechnya Bombing to Saudi Blasts, INDEP. (London), May 15,
2003, at 10, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
183. Marshall Ingwerson, Muslims of the Mountains Feel a Rift Over an Islam They Barely Knew,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 21, 1997, at 10.
184. Chechnya 's President Declares Islamic Law, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), Feb. 4, 1999,
at A4; Chronology of Events in Chechnya After Collapse of Soviet Union, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Sept. 30, 2003, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
185. Reese Erlich, Chechens Deny Their Republic is bin Laden Pawn, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9, 2001, at
5C.
Whether the apartment bombings were really the work of Islamist militants is questionable. David
Frum and Richard Perle write:
The Russian government blamed Chechen Islamic terrorists [for the apartment
bombings]-a story that did not seem very convincing even at the time and that became a
whole lot less convincing after a team of Russian secret policemen were caught shortly
afterward planting a large bomb in the basement of an apartment building in Ryazan.
(Their story: They were testing "security measures.")
DAVID FRUM & RICHARD PERLE, AN END TO EVIL: HOW TO WIN THE WAR ON TERROR 264 (2003).
186. Fareed Zakaria, Suicide Bombers Can be Stopped, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 25, 2003, at 57.
187. Georgie Anne Geyer, Moscow Ignoring Chechens' Valid Complaints, DESERET MORNING
NEWS (Salt Lake City), July 22, 2003, at A 1l.
VOL. 33:2
No OTHER GODS BEFORE ME
International Islamist groups also operate in many other countries, including
China,'8 8 Indonesia,'89 Thailand,1 90 and Uzbekistan.' 9' These holy warriors seek to
both extend the dar al-Islam in those areas where Islam's sphere of influence
overlaps with Christianity's and also forcibly establish Islam's preeminence within
the dar al-Islam itself. Muslim governments have been seen as legitimate targets
when the jihadists see them as insufficiently Islamic. Thus, for example, Islamist
groups in Egypt have been "engaged in a bloody battle to topple Mubarak's secular
regime and replace it with an Islamic state." 192  Even Saudi Arabia, with its
conservative system of shariah law, has not been safe from the militants' ire.
Journalist Peter Bergen has dubbed Saudi Arabia's misguided foreign policy
"riyalpolitik," wherein the Saudi government seeks to establish its Islamic
legitimacy by funding militant organizations outside its borders. 93  However,
Saudi Arabia's strategy continually backfires because the very groups that Saudi
Arabia funds generally see its government as un-Islamic. 94
These jihadist groups are a significant presence internationally. While the
growing backlash among liberal Muslims against the harsher incarnations of the
faith includes criticism ofjihadist groups,' 95 these groups' critics are often prone to
threats and intimidation. 196 These threats are even more severe when the critics
188. See, e.g., Beijing Links Four "Terrorist" Groups in China to Foreign Countries, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 15, 2003, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File; Derk Kinnane Roelofsma,
Confronting Islamism-2, UNITED PRESS INT'L, July 14, 2003, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
189. See Doug Bandow, Modern Religious Wars, NAT'L REv., July 17, 2002, LEXIS, News
Library, News Group File (discussing Laskar Jihad); Jane Perlez & James Brooke, Indonesian in Terror
Inquiry Lauds bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2002, at A10.
190. See Zachary Abuza, Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda's Southeast Asian Network,
CONTEMPORARY S.E. ASIA, Dec. 1, 2002, at 427; Andrew Perrin, Thailand's Terror; Has Thailand's
Muslim-Dominated South Served as a Training and Staging Base for Jihadi Terrorists?, TIME INT'L,
Nov. 25, 2002, at 24.
191. See David Filipov, Terror Crackdown May Push More to Extremism, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct.
27, 2002, at A28 (describing the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan as "the most-feared terrorist
organization in Central Asia"); Ottawa Adds 7 to List of Banned Terrorist Groups, EDMONTON SUN
(Alberta, Canada), Apr. 4, 2003, at 47 (discussing the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan).
192. Mohamad Bazzi, Egypt's War on Islamists; Government Acted Harshly to Crush Terrorist
Movements, NEWSDAY (New York), Oct. 12, 2001, at A57.
193. BERGEN, supra note 180, at 58-59.
194. Id.
195. Jihadist groups have been particularly prone to criticism by Muslims living in the West. For
examples of criticism by Western Muslims, see, for example, El Fadl, supra note 92. Another example
is Shaykh Hisham Kibbani, chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America. See Alex Alexiev,
The End of an Alliance, NAT'L REV., Oct. 28, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File ("As early
as 1999, the Naqshbandi leader in America, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, persuasively documented the
threat that Wahhabism posed to America; his warnings were met with vitriolic denunciations by the
Islamic establishment, and indifference on the part of the U.S. government."); Jeff Jacoby, Islam's
Unheard Moderates, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2000, at A13; Stephen Schwartz, Sufi Surfing: Pico Iyer
and the Californication of Mystical Islam, WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 22, 2003, LEXIS, News Library,
News Group File ("Here at home, no Islamic leader has been more outspoken, in demanding loyalty on
the part of American Muslims to the United States and its democratic polity, than Sheikh Muhammad
Hisham Kabbani of the Naqshbandi Sufis.").
196. For example, Khaled Abou El Fadl has reported: "Throughout my work, I've met so many
people who sympathize with me who tell me for the sake of my family, please quit speaking out." Rod
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reside within the Islamic sphere of influence.197 The fact that moderates are often
silenced only magnifies the power of groups devoted to the global jihad.
2. The Imposition of Shariah Law
Shariah law is still enforced today in most Muslim states, in one form or
another. Many Muslim states have officially established Islam as their state
religion. 198 This is true even of some Islamic states that are considered secular,
such as Egypt.' 99 Also, many officially secular Muslim states have largely
incorporated the shariah into their legal codes, and politicians are under great
pressure to uphold and enforce it.
The shariah's incorporation can be seen by the fact that proselytism by
minority faiths is explicitly forbidden under the law of most Muslim countries.
The most striking of these legal proscriptions can be found in Saudi Arabia, where
all non-Islamic expressions of religion are illegal. "It is even illegal to wear a
cross necklace, read a Bible, or utter a Christian prayer in the privacy of your own
home. '200  Other Islamic countries that ban proselytism by non-Muslim faiths
include Brunei, 20 1 Comoros,
20 2 Egypt,20 3 Iran,204 Jordan,
205 Kuwait, 20 6 Malaysia,
20 7
Dreher, Inside Islam, NAT'L REV., Jan. 8, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File. See also
Salim Mansur, The Bloody Struggle for Islam's Soul: Battle That Divides Muslims Has Spilled Over
Into a Global War, TORONTO SUN, Jan. 16, 2004, at 16 (explaining that Islamic fundamentalists have
attempted to systematically "intimidate and silence" more liberal Muslims living in the West).
197. See, e.g., David Crumm, Extreme Words Between Muslims, Christians Fuel Fires of Discord,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 3, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File ("There is no question
that extremists in Pakistan, claiming to act on behalf of Islam, are threatening moderate Muslims as
well as non-Muslims."); Incense, Silk and Jihad, ECONOMIST, May 31, 2003, LEXIS, News Library,
News Group File (noting that, in Southeast Asia, "extremists ... dominate the news and intimidate
more moderate Muslims"); Fred Nile, Chirac Right to Open Veil Debate, AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 22, 2003,
at 7 ("Moderate Muslims are being threatened by fundamentalist Muslims in Iraq, Egypt and
elsewhere.").
198. See, e.g., BANGL. CONST. art. 2A (1972), established by Constitution (Eighth Amendment)
Act No. 30 of 1988, reprinted in Bangl. Gazette Extraordinary (1988); Basic Law of Palestine art. 9
(2002); IRAN CONST. art. 12; KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA CONST. ch. 1, art. I; MOROCCO CONST. art.
6; PAK. CONST art. 2; REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 58 (noting that Islam is the
state religion in Mauritania), 176 (Malaysia); Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Things:
Anthropological Approaches to Law and Society in Conditions of Globalization, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 791, 813 (1995) ("Islam is the state religion in Niger .... "); Toby R. Unger, The Status of the
Arts in an Emerging State of Palestine, 14 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 193, 218 (1997) (noting that "the
majority of Arab states recognize Islam as their state religion").
199. Egypt is generally regarded as a secular country. See, e.g., Cameron Kamran, Iran Could Yet
be a Model for the Mideast, FIN. TIMES (London, England), June 20, 2003, at 21; Jonathan Steele,
Vengeful Fires Burn in Arabian Hearts: A New Generation is Angry and Islamist Terrorism Could
Reap Rewards, OBSERVER (London, England), Apr. 6, 2003, at 7. However, Egypt's Constitution
explicitly makes Islam the country's state religion. EGYPT CONST. art. 2; see also Christy Cutbill
McCormick, Comment, Exporting the First Amendment: America's Response to Religious Persecution
Abroad, 4 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 283, 303 (1998) ("Islam is the state religion of Egypt .....
200. SHEA, supra note 13, at 40.
201. REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 110.
202. Id. at 17 ("Foreign missionaries work in local hospitals and schools, but they are not allowed
to proselytize.").
203. Issandr el Amrani, Egypt Jails Two Scientologists, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Mar. 5, 2002, LEXIS,
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Mauritania, °s Morocco, 0 9 Somalia,1 ° Sudan,211 Uzbekistan,212 and Yemen." 3 In
many Muslim states where proselytizing is not officially forbidden, it is often
officially discouraged.
14
Consistent with Saudi Arabia's ban on all non-Islamic expressions of religion,
conversion out of Islam by Saudi citizens is a capital offense. 2 5  A number of
other Islamic states have also enacted laws prohibiting Muslims from converting to
another religion.2 16 Consistent with the classical implementation of shariah law,
these prohibitions on proselytism and conversion only cut one way. Proselytism of
non-Muslims is not prohibited, nor is it illegal for non-Muslims to convert to
News Library, News Group File (describing restrictions on proselytism in Egypt); Charles Kimball,
Resentment, Not Gospel, Likely to Spread, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Fla.), May 5, 2003, at A19; Andrew
Metz, One Egyptian's Junk is Another's Parish; Priest Converts Dump Into a Promised Land for
27,000 Cairo Poor, NAT'L CATHOLIC REP., Sept. 30, 1994, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File
("It is illegal for Christians to proselytize Muslims in Egypt.").
204. Religious Freedom Precarious in Middle East-Report, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 9,
1999, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File [hereinafter Religious Freedom Precarious].
205. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, JORDAN - CONSULAR INFORMATION SHEET (Nov. 26, 2001) LEXIS,
News Library, News Group File [hereinafter Jordan Consular Information Sheet].
206. Religious Freedom Precarious, supra note 205; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, KUWAIT - CONSULAR
INFORMATION SHEET (May 7,2001) LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
207. Faisal Bodi, Face to Faith: Conversion Theory, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 8, 2001, at 20.
208. REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 59.
209. David Ivanovich, Beliefs vs. Business; Proposed Sanctions Draw Fire, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Sept. 9, 1997, at I (describing restrictions on proselytism in Morocco); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
MOROCCO - CONSULAR INFORMATION (July 17, 2001) LEXIS, News Library, News Group File
("[S]ome activities, such as proselytizing or encouraging conversion to the Christian faith-both
considered legally incompatible with Islam-are prohibited .... In the past, American citizens have
been detained or arrested and expelled for discussing or trying to engage Moroccans in debate about
Christianity.") [hereinafter Morocco Consular Information Sheet].
210. See Martha Sawyer Allen, From the Crescent to the Cross, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.),
June 7, 2003, at 7B ("In Somalia it is illegal for non-Muslims to propagate their faith openly . .
211. SHEA, supra note 13, at 35.
212. Id. at 52 ("[T]he government has prohibited "missionary activities" in an ambiguous 1991 law
that fails to define such activities. Proselytism is prohibited in an attempt to avoid religious tensions
even though the constitution declares that citizens can 'profess and spread their faith."'); Religious
Extremism Threatens Kazakhstan: Security Chief AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 22, 1998, LEXIS,
News Library, News Group File.
213. Missionaries' Killer 'Defending' Islam, HAMILTON SPECTATOR (Ontario, Canada), Apr. 21,
2003, at C6 ("Yemeni law prohibits non-Muslims from proselytizing in this overwhelmingly Muslim
country.").
214. See, e.g., REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 28 (noting that while "[tihere is
no legal prohibition against proselytizing" in Djibouti, "proselytizing is discouraged").
215. SHEA, supra note 13, at 40.
216. See, e.g., Iran; Walk in Fear, ECONOMIST, July 23, 1994, at 39 (noting that apostasy is illegal
in Iran); Jordan Consular Information Sheet, supra note 205 (Jordan); Morocco Consular Information
Sheet, supra note 209 (Morocco); David Pryce-Jones, Islam in Action: Extremism Now, and
Everywhere. What Later?, NAT'L REv., Dec. 3, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File
(Algeria); Ira Rifkin, Vatican Official Says Christian-Muslim Relations Must be Reciprocal, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Tex.), June 7, 1997, at 10B (Kuwait); Willis Witter, Christians Hunker
Down in Pakistan, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2001, at AI (Pakistan).
Similarly, legal rulings in Malaysia make it almost impossible in practice for Muslims to convert to
another faith. REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 177.
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Islam.
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These restrictions on proselytism and conversion are not the only legal
obstacles that minority faiths face in Muslim states. Indeed, many Muslim states
have implemented restrictions that are not dictated by the shariah in order to
discourage the growth of minority faiths. For example, Comoros has restricted the
use of the country's three churches to noncitizens, and prohibits Comoros citizens
from congregating in them.218 The State Department reports that members of
minority religions in Iran "reported imprisonment, harassment, and/or intimidation
based on their religious beliefs." 21 9 In Nigerian provinces that have implemented
shariah law, it is "increasingly difficult to get a license to build a church," and
"several churches have been desecrated or burned down., 220 And Christian groups
in Sudan, such as those that provide humanitarian services, are required to apply
for special licenses, and there are both frequent delays and denials.221
Muslim states' efforts to bolster the Islamic faith are often buoyed by local
vigilante groups. While many commentators contend that these groups' actions are
contrary to true Islamic teachings, these groups believe that they are upholding the
shariah. To illustrate this point, one commentator vividly describes the kind of
oppression that Islamist groups inflict on Egypt's Coptic Christians:
Coptic Christians are among the most vulnerable of groups to persecution in
Egypt.... In February of 1997, 15 Coptic Christian youth were murdered by
Islamic fundamentalists. In March, nine more were victims in a terrorist attack.
Reports of murders of Christians are on the rise. Extremist Muslims routinely
abduct and rape non-Muslim women and girls and either marry them or force
them to convert to Islam. The government not only does nothing to protect non-
Muslims, it cooperates with the extremists by actively closing its eyes to the acts
of abduction, forced marriage, and murder. Over 1,000 people were killed by
militant Muslims since 1992, many of whom are Christian, and the Egyptian
government does nothing to punish these crimes. In March 1998, the thirteen-
year old daughter of a family who had converted to Christianity was kidnapped,
raped, and forced to convert to Islam. When her captors later released her, the
family members were killed by the terrorists who slit their bellies, and crushed
their heads with stones.
222
Local Muslim populations have also frequently engaged in acts of violence
directed at missionaries, and a number of missionaries have been killed in Muslim
217. See e.g., SHEA, supra note 13, at 35 (Sudan); Barney Zwartz, Unholy Free Speech Row
Catches Fire, THE AGE (Melbourne), Oct. 18, 2003, at 5 (describing a Pakistani Christian's account of
the pressure he faced to convert to Islam in Pakistan).
218. REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 16-17.
219. Id. at 429.
220. Ann M. Simmons, Nigerian States' Embrace of Islamic Law Triggers Alarm, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 2000, at Al.
221. SHEA, supra note 13, at 35; see also Chris Hedges, Sudan Presses Its Campaign to Impose
Islamic Law on Non-Muslims, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1992, at A6.
222. McCormick, supra note 199, at 304.
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nations since 9/11.223 Such attacks are intended not only to dispose of the
immediate victims, but also to intimidate anybody else who similarly considers
promoting a non-Islamic faith.
The coercive apparatus of the state is employed in Muslim countries not only
to prevent non-Islamic faiths from gaining power, but also to restrain Islamic sects
that are perceived as heretical. For example, Chad's Ministry of the Interior
banned an Islamic group that incorporated singing and dancing into its ceremonies
and allowed intermingling of the sexes.224 In Malaysia, members of what the
government perceives to be "deviant sects" are often detained without trial, and
members of the country's Shiite minority are subjected to surveillance.225 And
Saudi Arabia is intent on suppressing Sufism, which is perceived by Wahhabi
clerics as a deviation from true Islam.226
3. Da'wah
Global da'wah efforts are very strong at present, in large part because a
number of Middle Eastern states have chosen to funnel a substantial amount of
money to Islamic charities dedicated to spreading the faith. For example, a Saudi
news magazine has claimed that the Saudi royal family's efforts have resulted in
"some 210 Islamic centers wholly or partly financed by Saudi Arabia, more than
1,500 mosques and 202 colleges and almost 2,000 schools for educating Muslim
children in non-Islamic countries in Europe, North and South America, Australia,
and Asia.,
227
Motivations for either funding or carrying out da'wah efforts differ from
individual to individual. Virtually all Muslims evince a clear desire to help others
truly submit to Allah's will, and potentially, to save them from the hellfire in the
afterlife. For many, this desire is coupled with an urge to strengthen Islam
geopolitically. For example, Shamim A. Siddiqi's book, Methodology of Dawah
Ilallah in American Perspective, lays out a detailed plan for establishing Islamic
rule in the United States.228 Siddiqi argues that the conversion of the United States
to Islam is the most pressing task of Muslims today for three reasons. First,
Siddiqi asserts that Washington is the premier enemy of Islam in the contemporary
world. He writes that whenever Muslims have come close to establishing an
223. Scheherezade Faramarzi, US. Troops, Shiite Fighters Clash in Karbala; Gunmen Slay Two
Journalists from Polish Television, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 7, 2004, available at LEXIS, News
Library, News Group File; Laurie Goodstein, Seeing Islam as 'Evil' Faith, Evangelicals Seek Converts,
N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2003, at Al; see also Gethin Chamberlain, Al-Qaeda Targets UK Muslims in New
Terror Campaign, SCOTSMAN, Apr. 3, 2004, at I (reporting that a top al-Qaeda official has sent a
message to bin Laden's followers stating that their "prime target ... should be missionaries in Islamic
countries who try to convert Muslims to Christianity").
224. REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 15.
225. Id. at 178.
226. See, e.g., Stephen Schwartz, Whose Saudi Arabia, JERUSALEM POST, June 11, 2004, at 14.
227. Quoted in, Steven Stalinsky, Inside the Saudi Classroom, NAT'L REv., Feb. 7, 2003, available
at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
228. See Daniel Pipes, The Danger Within: Militant Islam in America, COMMENT., Nov. 2001, at
19 (discussing Siddiqi's book), available at http://www.danielpioes.oryliff.oho?id=77 (last visited Nov.
8, 2004).
2005
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Islamic state, the "treacherous hands of the secular West are always there... to
bring about [their] defeat., 229 Second, Siddiqi states that establishing Islamic rule
in America "would signal its final triumph over its only rival, that bundle of
Christianity and liberalism which constitutes contemporary Western
civilization., 230 Finally, Siddiqi contends that "the infusion of the United States
with Islamism would make for so powerful a combination of material success and
spiritual truth that the establishment of 'God's Kingdom' on earth would no longer
be 'a distant drean.'
231
Other Muslim leaders share Siddiqi's view that nothing would be a bigger
boon to their faith than an Islamized America. Ismail al-Faruqi, who founded the
International Institute of Islamic Thought in Hemdon, Virginia, has stated that
"[n]othing could be greater... than this youthful, vigorous, and rich continent [of
North America] turning away from its past evil and marching forward under the
banner of Allahu Akbar [God is great]. 232
Many other Muslim leaders believe that the idea of America turning toward
Islam is not a mere pipe dream, but rather a realistic goal. Siraj Wahaj, the first
Muslim to deliver the daily invocation before Congress, 233 has stated: "If we were
united and strong, we'd elect our own emir [leader] and give allegiance to him....
[T]ake my word, if 6-8 million Muslims unite in America, the country will come to
us."234 Ahmad Nawfal, who speaks frequently at Muslim rallies in the United
States, has stated that because "the United States has 'no thought, no values, and
no ideals,' if militant Muslims 'stand up, with the ideology that we possess, it will
be very easy for us to preside over this world.' ' 235 Canadian business professor
Masudul Alarn Choudhury has written "matter-of-factly and enthusiastically about
the 'Islamization agenda of North America.'
' 236
This "Islamization agenda of North America" is bolstered by the influx of
money from Islamic countries to Muslim organizations in the United States.
Perhaps because of this funding, which largely comes from Saudi Arabia, many
Muslim organizations in the United States have coalesced around a common
agenda. Moreoever, these efforts at promoting the Islamization of North America





233. See Rebecca Buckman, Muslim Voice Delivers House Invocation, USA TODAY, June 26,
1991, at 2A.
234. Pipes, supra note 228, at 19.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See, e.g., Abigail R. Esman, The Arabian Panther, SALON.COM, June 14, 2004, available at
LEXIS, News Library, News Group File (stating that the Arab European League "positions itself as an
uncompromising defender of European Muslims, eschewing assimilation and espousing confrontational
political ideas such as the introduction of sharia law in Europe"); Jane Barnes Mack-Cozzo, The
Islamization of Europe, AM. ENTER., Jan. 1, 2003, at 36, available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m2185/is1_-14/ai_96010652/print (last visited Nov. 6, 2004)
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also a geopolitical aspect to da'wah work that has been concretely articulated by
Muslim thinkers.
IV. CHRISTIANITY
The perception among Muslims that their faith possesses a geographic sphere
of influence is both more obvious and more dramatic in the present day than
Christians' perception of a Christian sphere of influence. However, to many
Christians, the idea of a Christian sphere of influence and the fact of intrusions into
this historical sphere are very real.
Groups that perceive a Christian sphere of influence are very influential in
some Western countries, and have a palpable influence on these countries' foreign
and domestic policy. Moreover, the "center of gravity in the Christian world has
shifted inexorably southward, to Africa, Asia, and Latin America. ,
23
8 As the
center of Christendom moves toward the Southern Hemisphere, the notion of a
distinct geographical Christian sphere of influence may become even more
important. After all, while Western Christians are increasingly secularized,
Christians in the Southern Hemisphere "are morally conservative, often to the
point of being what northerners would call puritanical, and theologically orthodox.
They adhere strictly to the word of Scripture, which commands their loyalty far
more than state or society; and they expect supernatural intervention in their daily
lives."2 3 9
Christianity is the world's largest religion, with about two billion adherents
worldwide. 240 Although Jesus Christ never had an army at his disposal, nor was he
ever a head of state, the Christian faith has been a major geopolitical force ever
since the Roman Empire became Christianized. 241 After the Christianization of the
Roman Empire, "Christians in government found themselves faced with...
questions that their religion had not wrestled with before." 242  These questions
spurred the development of a doctrine of religious warfare,243 and led theologians
to grapple with a number of other issues concerning Christian governance.
Today, Christianity's three major branches are Roman Catholicism, Eastern
Orthodoxy, and Protestantism.2 "4 In countries that fall within Christianity's sphere
of influence, Christians attempt to preserve their faith's primacy against secularism
(saying "Several Muslim leaders call openly for the introduction of sharia in Europe as soon as the
Muslim population increases enough to enforce the archaic Islamic law.").
238. JENKINS, supra note 17, at 2.
239. Sarah E. Hinlicky, Steeple Chase, NAT'L REV., May 20, 2002, available at LEXIS, News
Library, News Group File.
240. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
241. See J. Paul Martin, Religions, Human Rights, and Civil Society: Lessons from the Seventeenth
Century for the Twenty-First Century, 2000 B.Y.U. L. REV. 933, 933 (2000).
However, the Roman Empire's Christianization is not the first occurrence of "Christianity forming a
relationship with the secular state." JENKINS, supra note 17, at 18. "Almost certainly, Armenia was the
first state anywhere to establish Christianity as an official faith, which it did around the year 300." Id.
242. THOMAS F. MADDEN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES 1-2 (1999).
243. Id.
244. HUSTON SMITH, THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS 317 (1991).
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and other religions, and occasionally against other Christian denominations. This
Part first provides a historical account of how Christians have attempted to
preserve and expand their faith's perceived sphere of influence, and then examines
such efforts in the contemporary context.
A. Historical Use of Spheres of Influence
A number of excellent histories of Christianity are available, 245 and thus this
section does not attempt to comprehensively outline the history of the faith.
Instead, this section describes the methods that Christians have historically
employed to both preserve and expand the faith's sphere of influence. Five basic
tactics have been used: proselytism, state promotion of Christianity, state
enforcement of orthodoxy, military defense of the sphere of influence, and church
assertion of greater authority than the state. Each tactic will be explored in turn.
1. Proselytism
Since the advent of Christianity, the faith has relied heavily on proselytism to
fuel its expansion. Proselytism follows rather naturally from Christian theological
beliefs. Christians believe in a literal afterlife. They believe that, after we die,
some people will be rewarded with eternal life in heaven, while others will be
condemned to hell.246 The religion further holds that "humankind, although
created in God's image, fell into sin, and thus... human beings are intensely and
inherently sinful. 247 Because of humankind's sinful nature, Christians believe that
nobody can attain salvation in the afterlife through works alone. 248  Instead,
humankind's sins must be paid for. Christians believe that our sins are paid
through Jesus' sacrifice, that because Jesus was divine and perfect, he could give
his own life to allow all of humankind to attain salvation.
Christianity thus holds that only by accepting the gift of Jesus' sacrifice can
one be saved. 249 Because Christians hold an exclusivist view of salvation, many
245. For two such excellent histories see generally PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY
(1976), and MOYNAHAN, supra note 138. For a history written from a Catholic perspective, see
generally THOMAS P. NEILL & RAYMOND H. SCHMANDT, HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (1957).
246. See Jonathan Edwards, Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God, in JONATHAN EDWARDS:
REPRESENTATIVE SELECTIONS 155, 161 (Clarence H. Faust & Thomas H. Johnson eds., rev. ed. 1962),
available at http://www.ccel.org/e/edwards/sermons/sinners.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
247. David M. Smolin, Church, State, and International Human Rights: A Theological Appraisal,
73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1515, 1523 (1998).
248. See Titus 3:5 ("[Hie saved us, not because of righteous things we had done, but because of his
mercy."); Ephesians 2:8-9 ("For it is by grace you have been saved, through faith-and this not from
yourselves, it is the gift of God-not by works, so that no one can boast."); Hebrews 11:6 ("And
without faith it is impossible to please God ...."); John 6:29 ("Jesus answered, 'The work of God is
this: to believe in the one he has sent."'). Works are more important to salvation in Catholic theology
than in Protestant theology. Nonetheless, Catholics generally do not believe that salvation can be
attained through works alone, without faith in Christ.
249. See John 8:24 (Jesus states: "[l]f you do not believe that I am the one I claim to be, you will
indeed die in your sins"); John 14:6 (Jesus states: "I am the way and the truth and the life. No one
comes to the Father except through me"); Acts 4:12 ("Salvation is found in no one else, for there is no
other name under heaven given to men by which we must be saved."); I Timothy 2:5 ("For there is one
God and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus .... ").
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have felt compelled to share their faith with others since the religion's inception.
Moreover, as one missionary has explained, mission work is compelled in the
Bible through "the 'great commission' found at the end of the Bible's account of
Jesus' life on earth when he commissioned his followers to 'go therefore and make
disciples of all nations (ethnic groups), baptizing them... [and] teaching them to
observe (obey) all that I have commanded you."'
250
Paul was the key figure in the early church's evangelical efforts. Prior to his
conversion, Paul had been a zealous Pharisee who fervently aided the persecution
of Jesus' followers.2 5  However, after Paul's conversion, he "felt himself to be
'entrusted with the gospel of the uncircumcision,' that is, with the conversion of
,,252non-Jews. ' 2 Driven by this belief, Paul traveled widely, preaching the gospel
during his journeys. Because of the efforts of Paul and other early believers, "[b]y
the 150s there were churches in almost all the provinces between Syria and Rome,
extending through Alexandria to Carthage in North Africa and beyond to





Although the Eastern church was, early in the faith's history, "the glory of
Christendom," the emergence of Islam forced Christianity westward into "the dark
recesses of barbarian Europe.' 2 4 Christianity first took root in Europe through
proselytism, and eventually came to completely dominate the continent through
political arrangements. For example, after the Germans finally defeated the
Magyars on the battlefield, the Germans "pressed their religion on them."
255
Political marriages were also used to spread the faith.
As Christianity became dominant in Europe, evangelism on the continent
intensified in a variety of forms. As sea travel became more viable in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, Christianity spread even further. For example, the faith
took root in Japan during this period before being brutally suppressed.
25 6
In this overseas mission work, missionaries who were sensitive to local
culture and were willing to adapt the faith to local customs were particularly
effective.257 However, colonialism was also strongly linked to proselytism. For
example, after Spain conquered the Philippines in 1565, the Spanish crown funded
and controlled extensive proselytism efforts that produced over two million
converts by 1620.258 Likewise, the spread of Christianity was linked to the
250. E-mail from Richard P. Bailey, Christian Missionary, to Daveed Gartenstein-Ross (Apr. 14,
2002, 17:48:40 EST) (on file with author) (quoting Matthew 28:19, 20); see also Mark 16:15; Luke
24:47-48; John 20:21; Acts 1:8.
251. See, e.g., Acts 8:1, 9:1-2. Christians believe that God miraculously led Paul (known as Saul in
Hebrew) to belief in Christ. See id. 9:2-6, 9:17.
252. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 25-26.
253. Id. at 65.
254. Id. at 157.
255. Id. at 208.
256. Id. at 561-62.
257. For example, it was through sensitivity and adaptation to local customs that the Jesuit
Alexander de Rhodes helped to spread Christianity through Vietnam. Id. at 566.
258. Id. at 567.
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colonization of the Americas. Although Christianity was often spread
coercively, 259 some missionary efforts, such as those of the Jesuits in Paraguay,
were more humane and sensitive to indigenous culture.260 European colonialism,
coupled with such developments in transportation technology as steam power,
"provided the Christian soldier and missionary with global reach" by the early
nineteenth century.261
2. State Promotion of Christianity
Although the early Christians faced an enormous amount of persecution under
Roman rule,262 their fortunes changed dramatically in 312 when Emperor
Constantine believed that he received a sign from God that led him to embrace
Christianity.263 In 313, Constantine and the Eastern Emperor Licinius jointly
issued an edict protecting all religious creeds.264 Thereafter, Christian power in
Rome grew. Eventually the Roman Empire was consolidated as a Christian
259. See JAMES AXTELL, THE EUROPEAN AND THE INDIAN: ESSAYS IN THE ETHNOHISTORY OF
COLONIAL NORTH AMERICA 270 (1981); George Dargo, Religious Toleration and Its Limits in Early
America, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 341, 358-59 (1996) ("For Native Americans, conversion to Christianity
was more a matter of survival than of liberation. Assimilation to European culture on European terms
was the only alternative to physical annihilation.").
260. Father Antonio Ruiz de Montoya, a Jesuit in Paraguay, proudly wrote, "Spaniards have not
penetrated this area. It was conquered by the Gospel alone." MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 525.
261. Id. at 633.
262. NEILL & SCHMANDT, supra note 245, at 33.
Although paganism was the official religion of Rome, Rome maintained an attitude of religious
tolerance toward the cultures it conquered, "provided they added the goddess Rome and the divine
emperor to their circle of deities." Id.; see also David Stockton, The Founding of the Empire, in THE
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE ROMAN WORLD 146, 162-63 (John Boardman et al. eds., 1991). Those who
refused to worship Rome's pagan gods were subject "to the charge of atheism, a capital offense under
Roman law." NEILL & SCHMANDT, supra note 245, at 33-34. Although the Jews' thoroughly
monotheistic beliefs made them unwilling to adopt additional deities, Rome was willing to exempt them
from this religious edict because Jewish monotheism was ethnically circumscribed. Id. at 34.
However, after Paul converted to Christianity, he concentrated on spreading the gospel to the Gentiles.
See supra notes 253-54 and accompanying text. Once Gentiles began to embrace Christianity, the faith
lost any entitlement it may have claimed to the exception to Rome's atheism laws that had been
afforded to Judaism. Although there was "considerable variation" in the degree of persecution that the
early Christians faced, NEILL & SCIIMANDT, supra note 245, at 33, it was often quite severe. See
Robert John Araujo, S.J., The International Personality and Sovereignty of the Holy See, 50 CATH. U.
L. REV. 291, 295 (2001); Scott Kent Brown II, Note & Comment, The Coptic Church in Egypt: A
Comment on Protecting Religious Minorities from Nonstate Discrimination, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1049,
1052-53 (2000).
263. See David M. Smolin, The City of God Meets Anabaptist Monasticism: Reflections on the
Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 841, 848 (1996). In October 312,
Constantine was camped north of Rome, about to do battle with his rival Maxentius. According to
legend, Constantine there experienced a vision of a cross of light in the heavens which bore the
inscription "Conquer by this Sign." G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and
the Jurisprudence of the Federal Criminal Law, 2002 BYU L. REv. 829, 902 n.181 (2002). Constantine
dutifully carried the cross into battle, and subsequently "gave credit for the victory to the god of the
Christians." Milner S. Ball, Book Review, Cross and Sword, Victim and Law: A Tenative Response to
Leonard Levy's Treason Against God, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1007, 1007 (1983) (reviewing LEONARD W.
LEvY, TREASON AGAINST GOD: A HISTORY OF THE OFFENSE OF BLASPHEMY (1981)).
264. Blakey & Murray, supra note 263, at 902 n.181.
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stronghold.
The Christianization of the Roman Empire spurred Christians to perceive a
linkage between church and state. Ever since the Roman Empire became
Christianized, some Christians have attempted to promote their faith through the
state, and to extend the faith's sphere of influence into the non-Christian world.
Perhaps due in part to the early Christian experience of persecution at the
hands of the state, the newly Christianized Roman Empire suppressed other
religions. In 356 Constantine's son Constantius ordered all pagan temples closed
and "prohibited sacrifices to the gods on pain of death. 265 In 391, all pagan cults
were banned. Pagans "were denied the legal right to own property," and clerics
assisted Christian mobs in destroying pagan idols.26 Such repression of other
faiths periodically resurfaced throughout the history of Christianity-for example,
in the expulsion of all Jews and Moors from Spain following the reconquista.267
The state has also historically promoted Christianity through the enactment of
laws that codify Christian morals. For example, when Charlemagne breathed new
life into the Western empire, he established special clerical courts, and made "the
murder of priests, eating meat in Lent, pagan cremations of the dead, damaging
church buildings, and refusal of baptism" capital offenses.268 A later dramatic
example of state enforcement of Christian morals is Spain's inquisitors, who, in
addition to expelling the Moors and brutally clamping down on perceived
blasphemers, made equally brutal efforts at enforcing general Christian morals.
These efforts included the burning of bigamists, usurers, and homosexuals.269
There were also biblical justifications for the witch hunts that took hold in Europe
from the late fifteenth through seventeenth century, and reached the Americas in
the form of the Salem witch trials.270
3. State Enforcement of Orthodoxy
The state has also been used to promote the Christian sphere of influence
through the enforcement of orthodoxy. The first example of this promotion was
Constantine's decision to convene a worldwide council of the Church in May of
325 to resolve the controversy surrounding the teachings of Arius.271  Later,
265. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 105.
266. Id. at 107.
267. See Tim Dunne, The Spectre of Globalization, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 17 (1999);
Andre Lambelet, Book Review, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 630, 631 (2000) (reviewing DAVID S.
LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS: WHY SOME ARE So RICH AND SOME So POOR
(1998)).
268. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 204; see also Steven D. Smith, The "Secular," the
"Religious," and the "Moral": What Are We Talking About?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 487, 495
(2001) (noting that Charlemagne was "persuaded of the value of compulsory baptism").
269. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 450.
270. Id. at 479. One such justification can be found in Exodus 22:18, which states, "Thou shalt not
suffer a witch to live."
271. THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE BIBLICAL WORLD 565 (Michael D. Coogan ed., 1998); Richard
Stith, On Death and Dworkin: A Critique of His Theory oflnviolability, 56 MD. L. REV. 289, 364 n.321
(1997). Arius was "a priest at Alexandria who denied the full divinity of Christ and held that the Son
was subordinate to the Father." MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 99. Although Arius was
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ruptures occurred in the church over relatively obscure questions of Christology,
and Christian states attempted to resolve these theological issues by brutally
imposing orthodoxy upon their subjects. For example, although Arianism was
repudiated by the Council of Nicea, it later came to dominate Africa. "All who did
not convert to Arianism were declared heretics; all Catholic churches were closed,
all masses, baptisms, and ordinations banned, all liturgical books destroyed.,
272
This brutal imposition of orthodoxy caused great schisms in the Christian
world, and aided Muslims in expanding the Islamic sphere of influence by
conquering Christian lands.273 Yet despite the problems that state enforcement of
orthodoxy produced during Islam's ascendancy, Christian states often continued to
enforce orthodoxy of beliefs thereafter.
One example of this is the Counter-Reformation. As the Reformation eroded
the Catholic Church's power, the Church attempted to maintain its influence
throughout Europe with the Counter-Reformation, which employed such tactics as
"censorship, inquisition, and the military leagues of Catholic powers., 274
But the Inquisition took these policies designed to enforce Orthodoxy within
the Christian state to their extreme. 275 Pope Alexander III introduced the concept
of professional inquisitors in 1163 to unearth heretics, and "[h]is successor, Lucius
III, established a bishops' inquisition, dependent on local sees, and opened the way
for the execution of heretics by fire. 276 Before the Catholic Church was dissolved
in England, its persecution of Protestants was so severe that "[t]he Book of
Martyrs, a work of racy propaganda... which.., recorded Protestant deaths, was to
become a second bible in English homes."
277
Pope Paul III appointed six cardinals as inquisitors-general, "to whom all
baptized Christians were subject, at least in theory., 278 One cardinal was so eager
to proceed with the Inquisition that he "bought a house at his own expense, and
equipped it with offices and dungeons, without waiting for a grant from the papal
treasury. '279 Among the rules that the Inquisition set for Catholics was that "[n]o
man is to lower himself by showing toleration towards any sort of heretic, least of
all a Calvinist."
290
One particularly brutal form of the continent-wide Inquisition was the Spanish
Inquisition, which lasted from 1478 to 1834. Moynahan notes that "[t]he vast
majority of its victims were of Jewish and Moorish blood.",281 The Spanish
excommunicated for this teaching, Constantine felt that a worldwide council was warranted because a
large following of convicted Arians remained even after their leader's excommunication. Id.
272. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 155.
273. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
274. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 415.
275. See generally EDWARD PETERS, INQUISITION (1988).
276. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 278.
277. Id. at 408.
278. Id. at 440.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 441.
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Inquisitors made special efforts to root out those who secretly practiced either
Islam or Judaism. Protestants were also "burned out of Spain before they had a
toehold., 28 2 .Numerous Protestants were literally burned at the stake because the
Spanish government feared that the rise of Protestantism could divide that
country.
283
Conversely, Catholics were often suppressed by the new Protestant states that
emerged during the Reformation. This was the case in England, where the
Treasons Act of 1534, the Act for the Dissolution of the Lesser Monasteries of
1536, the Act for the Dissolution of the Greater Monasteries of 1539, and the Six
Articles Act "destroyed the last vestiges of the Catholic Church within the English
realm."'28 Thereafter, unrepentant Catholics "faced execution and forfeiture of
their estates. 28 5 In Elizabethan England, the government required a.special license
before books of Scripture could be published, and "[e]xtremist puritan works as
well as Catholic devotional literature were banned.,
286
Attempts to utilize the state to impose Christian orthodoxy continued when
the New World was settled. For example, during colonial times, the government
of Virginia declared "that 'no popish recusant' who strayed into the colony could
hold office as a 'secretary, counsellor, register, commissioner, surveyor or sheriff,
or any other public place, but be utterly disabled for the same. ' - 287 Attempted
imposition of orthodoxy in America could also be seen many years later in the
Scopes trial, where a biology teacher in Tennessee was prosecuted for teaching
evolution in defiance of state law.288 At the trial, special prosecutor and former
presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan made this obvious by "stat[ing]
282. Id. at 450.
283. Id. at 425-26. The Catholic Church also targeted Catholics who fell short of the Church's
ideals. Pope Paul IV imprisoned a liberal cardinal on the grounds of "heresy on the veneration of saints
and relics." Id. He also devoted attention to the problem of "married men singing in the Sistine choir,"
concerned that they may "contaminate the chaste purity of the papal chapel." Id. Pope Paul IV's
successor, Sixtus V, "executed clergy who broke their vows of chastity and attempted to impose the
death penalty for adultery." Id. at 427.
284. Jack Moser, The Secularization of Equity: Ancient Religious Origins, Feudal Christian
Influences, and Medieval Authoritarian Impacts on the Evolution of Legal Equitable Remedies, 26 CAP.
U. L. REV. 483, 537 (1997).
285. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 405.
286. Id. at 432.
287. Id. at 577.
288. See EDWARD J. LARSON, SUMMER FOR THE GODS: THE SCOPES TRIAL AND AMERICA'S
CONTINUING DEBATE OVER SCIENCE AND RELIGION (1997); Judith A. Villarreal, Note, God and
Darwin in the Classroom: The Creation/Evolution Controversy, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 335, 340-43
(1988).
2005
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
before a national audience that he objected to Darwinism because he 'fear[ed] we
shall lose the consciousness of God's presence in our daily lives if [people] accept
[evolution].' ' 289 Indeed, Bryan began his opening statement with the proclamation
that "[i]f evolution wins, Christianity goes." 290
4. Military Defense of the Sphere of Influence
Christians first grappled with the question of religious warfare after the
Roman Empire became Christianized. 291 The just war doctrines that emerged
gained relevance in the seventh century and beyond, with the emergence of Islam.
Christian countries frequently responded to Islam's challenge through military
action carried out in Christ's name. The justifications advanced for these military
actions underscore the perception that Christianity possessed a geographic sphere
of influence. For example, the reconquista was in large part motivated by the
notion that Spain remained a part of Christendom even after Muslim armies
conquered it.292 Likewise, the major motivating factor behind the Crusades was
Turkish armies threatening the Christian sphere of influence through their advance
on the Christian Byzantine Empire.
293
The battle for control of Europe was hotly contested between the forces of
Christianity and Islam for several centuries. While Islam gained a strong foothold
in Europe, the Christian countries were eventually able to drive it from the
continent, and later colonize much of the Islamic world.294
Some battles to consolidate the Christian sphere of influence were waged
against faiths other than Islam. During the Crusades, for example, both Jews and
heretics in Europe proved ready targets for the Crusaders. As far as some
Crusaders were concerned, "[t]he distant Moslems had played no part in [Christ's]
Passion," while the Jews were "the descendants of those who had. ' '295  Also,
although the Teutonic Order was "founded as a hospital order of German knights
and priests in Palestine," it later became a military order and shifted its focus from
289. Diana M. Rosenberg, Notes & Comments, Monkey Business and Unnatural Selection:
Opening the Schoolhouse Door to Religion by Discrediting the Tenets of Darwinism, 9 J.L. & POL'Y
611,618 (2001).
290. Mark B. Lewis, The Monkey Trial, Revisited: 75 Years Later, Scopes Still Fires the
Imagination, LEGAL TIMES, July 10, 2000, at 30.
291. See MADDEN, supra note 242, at 1-2.
292. Id. at 4. Conversely, some Muslims now believe that Spain must be forcibly returned to
Islamic rule because it had once been Muslim territory. See BERGEN, supra note 181, at 53 (quoting
Abdullah Azzam).
293. MADDEN, supra note 242, at 5.
294. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
295. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 229. The clergy and officials in European cities often
attempted (generally without success) to protect the local Jewry. Id. at 230 (discussing the efforts of the
bishop of Prague and the Hungarian king Coloman).
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the Holy Land "to the pagan borderlands of Europe" in an effort to Christianize
those borderlands. 296  Later, when conflict between Protestants and Catholics
reigned throughout Europe, both sects engaged in military warfare against the
other.297
The conquest of the New World provides a further example of how military
means were used to expand the Christian sphere of influence. The early Spanish
conquistadors arrived in the Americas armed with the Requerimiento
(requirement), which they would read to the natives upon encountering them. The
Requerimiento explained that the Pope, God's earthly representative, had granted
the natives' land to the king of Spain, and that the natives should recognize the
authority of the Pope and Spanish crown or else "with the help of God we shall
forcefully enter your country and shall make war against you in all ways... that we
can., 298 When Pope Alexander VI granted all lands in the New World west of the
Azores to Spain and those to the east to Portugal, he stated that the purpose of this
act was to ensure that Christianity "may in all places be exalted, amplified, and
enlarged, whereby the health of souls may be procured, and the barbarous nations
subdued and brought to the faith. ' 299 Needless to say, the conquistadors had a
dramatic effect on the New World. "Not only did millions of Indians perish at the
hands of Columbus, the Spanish, and pioneers; they were plagued with diseases
intentionally loosed upon them, tortured by domestic animals, disemboweled,
roasted on pits, scalped for state sanctioned bounty, and forced to walk thousands
of miles in inhumane conditions."
3° °
Similarly, the Portuguese exploration of the West African coasts was aided by
a "series of papal bulls [that] gave them title of ownership over newly found lands,
power to enslave the natives, and a commission to propagate the faith.",30 1 When
the Roman Church endorsed these conquests of Africa and the Americas, "[t]he
belief that Christian conquest was sanctified-and indeed demanded-by the
expansion of the faith was... firmly implanted. 30 2
Later, religion would play a role in the doctrine of Manifest Destiny, which
fueled the United States' geographic expansion.30 3 One frontiersman, for example,
296. Id. at 220.
297. Id. at 376, 459-62, 468, 475-76.
298. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 48-49 (3d ed.
1993); see also WILLiAM H. PRESCOTr, TIE HISTORY OF THE CONQUEST OF MEXICO 136 (C. Harvey
Gardiner ed., 1966) (explaining that because Europeans believed that paganism was "a sin to be
punished with fire... in this world, and eternal suffering in the next," the Europeans believed that "the
territory of the heathen, wherever found, [was forfeit to the Holy See], and as such was freely given
away by the head of the Church, to any temporal potentate whom he pleased, that would assume the
burden of conquest").
299. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 506.
300. David M. Osterfeld, Plastic Indians, Nazis, and Genocide: A Perspective on America's
Treatment of Indian Nations, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 623, 626 (1998).
301. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 506.
302. Id. at 507.
303. ALBERT K. WEINBERG, MANIFEST DESTINY (1935); William Bradford, "With a Very Great
Blame on Our Hearts": Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with
Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 35 n.162 (2002-2003) ("'Manifest Destiny,' a term which first
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declared: "The same inscrutable Arbiter that decreed the downfall of Rome has
pronounced the doom of extinction upon the red men of America. ' 3°
5. Church Assertion of Greater Authority than the State
The church has also historically asserted that it possesses greater authority
than the state does. This assertion is especially true in the Catholic tradition. Pope
Gregory VII provided a "list of twenty-seven theses he drew up to outline his
powers as Vicar of Christ and St. Peter's successor" which was known as the
dictatus. 30 5 The dictatus provided, among other things, that no person on earth
could judge the Pope, that princes are required to kiss the Pope's feet, and that the
Pope is empowered to depose emperors.
30 6
Pope Gregory VII also acted on his thesis that the pope could depose
emperors. "He accused Emperor Henry IV... of simony and interference in the
affairs of the Church., 30 7 In response, Henry IV convened a council designed to
declare Gregory's election void. Gregory's response was furious: "On the part of
God the omnipotent, I forbid Henry to govern the kingdom of Italy and Germany.
I absolve all his subjects from every oath they have taken or may take, and I
excommunicate every person who shall serve him as king., 30 8 The young Henry
backed down in the face of this furious papal response, crossing the Alps in
midwinter to do penance. Upon entering the Pope's presence: "Henry was stripped
of his clothes and thrown the hair shirt of beggary; he clutched a broom and a pair
of shears, tokens of his willingness to be whipped and shorn." 30 9 Henry then stood
in ankle-deep snow for three days, praying for forgiveness.
310
B. Contemporary Use of Spheres of Influence
Today, "[t]he United States expressly separates church and state and the
nations of Europe likewise have secular legal systems., 31  Religious minorities in
Christian countries are generally afforded great latitude in the practice of their
appeared in print in 1845, refers to the nineteenth-century political philosophy holding that the United
States was charged with a divinely-inspired mission of extending its moral enlightenment, democratic
principles, and republican values to the furthest reaches of North America."); Hon. Hugh F. Landerkin,
Custody Disputes in the Provincial Court of Alberta: A New Judicial Dispute Resolution Model, 35
ALBERTA L. REv. 627, 634 (1997) ("During reconstruction after the Civil War, American society
changed rapidly. Industrialization occurred. With increased immigration people moved westward,
spurred on by the doctrine of manifest destiny.").
304. See MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 607.
305. Id. at 217.
306. Id.




311. Richard E. Vaughan, Defining Terms in the Intellectual Property Protection Debate: Are the
North and South Arguing Past Each Other When We Say "Property"? A Lockeian, Confucian, and
Islamic Comparison, 2 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 307, 351 (1996); see also Maimon Schwarzschild,
Religion and Public Debate in a Liberal Society: Always Oil and Water or Sometimes More Like Rum
and Coca-Cola?, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 903, 913 (1993) ("The situation in the developed countries
today is very different. Whatever the rate of church-going ... we live in societies that are essentially
secular.").
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faith, and are even allowed to proselytize to Christians.312 The success of Islamic
da'wah in the West is testament to the greater latitude afforded to religious
minorities in Christian countries.313
However, this tolerance does not mean that efforts to preserve and expand
Christianity's perceived sphere of influence are moribund. Rather, some Christian
groups in the West, such as the religious right in the United States, wield great
political influence even over foreign policy matters. These groups often use their
influence to attempt to strengthen the perceived Christian sphere of influence.
Moreover, as mentioned above, the global center of Christianity is moving toward
the Southern Hemisphere, where adherents' practice of the Christian faith takes on
a completely different character-more puritanical and orthodox-than it does in
the North.314 These Southern Christians appear more intent upon preserving a
geographical Christian sphere of influence than do their Northern counterparts.
Thus, as the center of Christianity moves southward, the efforts to define, preserve
and expand a Christian sphere of influence may become more apparent.
This section now examines how four of the mechanisms that historically have
been used to preserve and expand the Christian sphere of influence are employed
today.
315
312. See REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 1-2 (discussing freedom of religious
practice in Angola), 7-8 (Burundi), 10-11 (Cape Verde), 18-20 (Democratic Republic of the Congo),
20-21 (Republic of the Congo), 33-36 (Ethiopia), 39-43 (Ghana), 51-52 (Lesotho), 54-55 (Madagascar),
55-57 (Malawi), 64-65 (Namibia), 77-78 (Sao Tome and Principe), 80-81 (Seychelles), 84-87 (South
Africa), 93-95 (Swaziland), 99-102 (Uganda), 102-03 (Zambia), 109-10 (Australia), 146-48 (Fiji), 179-
80 (Marshall Islands), 180-81 (Federated States of Micronesia), 182-83 (Nauru), 183-85 (New
Zealand), 185-87 (Palau), 187-88 (Papua New Guinea), 188-92 (Philippines), 192-93 (Samoa), 196-97
(Solomon Islands), 201-02 (Tonga), 202-03 (Tuvalu), 203-05 (Vanuatu), 221-23 (Andorra), 227-31
(Austria), 241-44 (Belgium), 255-58 (Croatia), 265-67 (Denmark), 267-69 (Estonia), 269-71 (Finland),
280-86 (Germany), 292-95 (Hungary), 295-98 (Iceland), 298-99 (Ireland), 300-02 (Italy), 310-12
(Latvia), 312-13 (Liechtenstein), 314-18 (Lithuania), 318-19 (Luxembourg), 319-21 (Macedonia), 321-
22 (Malta), 323-27 (Moldova), 327-28 (Monaco), 328-31 (the Netherlands), 331-33 (Norway), 333-37
(Poland), 337-39 (Portugal), 364-65 (San Marino), 365-69 (Slovak Republic), 369-70 (Slovenia), 370-
73 (Spain), 373-75 (Sweden), 375-78 (Switzerland), 391-97 (Ukraine), 397-401 (United Kingdom),
541-42 (Antigua and Barbuda), 542-46 (Argentina), 546-47 (Bahamas), 547-48 (Barbados), 548-50
(Belize), 550-52 (Bolivia), 552-54 (Brazil), 554-55 (Canada), 555-58 (Chile), 567-68 (Dominica), 568-
69 (Dominican Republic).
313. See, e.g., Peter Brookes, Jihadi Juniors Are Growing Up Fast, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 23,
2003, at 31 (noting that the French government estimates that there are 100,000 converts to Islam in that
country); Tamer el-Ghobashy, Fertile Crescent: Conversions to Islam on Rise in U.S., DAILY NEWS
(N.Y.), Dec. 26, 2003, at 35 (explaining that 30,000 Americans convert to Islam annually); Fabien
Novial, Growing Number of Germans Embracing Islam, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 25, 2003,
available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
314. See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
315. A fifth historical mechanism, state promotion of Christianity, is not worth discussing in depth
because secularizing trends have minimized the importance of this mechanism. However, it is worth
briefly noting that there are a number of contemporary examples of states promoting the Christian faith.
For example, many commentators perceive the Bush Administration's faith-based initiatives as "a
conspiracy to move big bucks from secular to Christian groups." Marvin Olasky, Faith-Based Plans
Advance With Little Fanfare, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Tex.), Oct. 3, 2003, at Al5.
The Greek government provides financial support to the Greek Orthodox Church "by, for example,
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1. Proselytism
Christian missionary efforts are very strong today. For a period following
decolonization, there was a retrenchment in evangelistic efforts because the
missions were viewed as "an arm of colonialism." 316 Indeed, Professor Jenkins
reports that "[b]y 1970, African churches in particular were calling for a
moratorium on Western missions because they stunted the growth of local
initiatives. 3 17  However, missions today are well-funded and plentiful, and are
increasingly focused on the Muslim world.
This shift in missionary focus toward the Islamic world has occurred
gradually. Through the late 1970s, missionary efforts primarily focused on Latin
America, Africa, and the Iron Curtain countries. 318 A Time cover story by David
Van Biema recounts the intellectual forces behind the shift toward greater
evangelism in the Middle East:
A missions strategist named Ralph Winter suggested in 1974 that Christians turn
their attention from areas already exposed to Christ to "unreached people
groups" who had never heard the Gospel.... In 1989 Argentine-born evangelist
Luis Bush pointed out that 97% of the unevangelized lived in a "window"
between the 10th and 40th latitudes. This immense global slice, he explained,
was disproportionately poor; the majority of its inhabitants "enslaved" by Islam,
Hinduism and Buddhism and, ultimately, by Satan. In a later paper, Bush urged
Christians, "Put on the full armor of God and fight with the weapons of spiritual
warfare."
3 19
Today, the organizational strength of Christian missionary efforts that target
paying for the salaries and religious training of clergy, and financing the construction and maintenance
of Orthodox Church buildings." REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 287. Leaders of
other religious groups in Greece have argued that taxes on religious organizations are discriminatory
because the government subsidizes the Greek Orthodox Church but not other faiths. Id. at 288. In
Finland, the Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Orthodox Church have been established as the state
churches. Id. at 270. The governments of some Catholic countries have also implemented policies
designed to promote Catholicism. Before the Italian Constitution was adopted in 1947, a 1929
Concordat "established Catholicism as the country's state religion." Id. at 300. Although a 1984
revision "formalized the principle of a secular state," it also "maintained the principle of state support
for religion." Id. The Catholic Church is also able to select the teachers for "'hour of religion' courses"
in the public schools. Id. at 301. Italy has provided financial assistance to Catholic schools when
enrollment declined, and the presence of Catholic symbols on Italian courtroom or government office
walls seems to make some religious minorities feel uncomfortable. Id. In Spain, four 1979 accords
between Spain and the Holy See define the country's relationship with Catholicism on economic,
religious education, military and judicial matters. Id. at 371. The Catholic Church is also financed
through the Spanish tax system, and, received approximately $10 million in 1999. Id. Other majority
Catholic countries in which the state promotes the Catholic faith in some way include Angola, where
state-owned television broadcasts Catholic Church services live on Sunday morning, id. at 1, and Cape
Verde, where the government provides the Catholic Church with "free broadcast time for religious
services." Id. at 11.
316. JENKINS, supra note 17, at 42.
317. Id.
318. Van Biema, supra note 4, at 40.
319. Id.
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Muslims is striking. Soon after the United States toppled Afghanistan's Taliban
and Saddam Hussein's dictatorship in Iraq, evangelical missionaries entered both
countries with the hope of spreading the gospel.32° One missionary team shipped
1.3 million Christian tracts to Iraq following the U.S. military victory, and an
American evangelical reports plans to bring one million Bibles to the country in
future missions.
321
Many contemporary evangelists have clearly articulated a worldview in which
Islam has been intruding upon the Christian sphere of influence through its
extensive da'wah efforts in the West, while Islamic countries prevent Christian
missionary efforts from making similar inroads in the Muslim world. Luis Bush
has written: "From its center in the 10/40 Window, Islam is reaching out
energetically to all parts of the globe; in a similar strategy, we must penetrate [its]
heart with the liberating truth of the gospel.,
322
Like Muslims who engage in da'wah work, the sincerity of Christian
missionaries cannot be doubted. "They are far better informed and more actively
concerned than the average American citizen about the Islamic world's material
needs, and their desire to share Christ springs in the main from a similarly
generous impulse. 323 However, many of them clearly perceive their missionary
efforts to be linked to an expansion of the Christian sphere of influence. One
missionary, preparing to share the gospel in Iraq, referred to Christian missions as
attempts to pierce "Satan's armor., 324 After engaging in extensive interviews with
missionaries working to bring the gospel to Muslims, Van Biema concluded that
"while most evangelical missionaries love Muslims, they hope to replace Islam.' 325
2. State Enforcement of Orthodoxy
Today, religious minorities clearly enjoy far more rights in the Christian
world than they do in the Muslim world. Virtually every Christian country
provides religious minority groups with extensive rights to practice their own
faiths.
326
However, some state-led efforts to impose religious orthodoxy are apparent.
Sometimes these efforts manifest themselves in suspicion of newer, non-traditional
faiths. For example, Spain's parliament "approved a nonbonding resolution calling
on the Government to reinforce measures against the activity of destructive 'sects'
in the country and to create a permanent organization to monitor these
organizations. 32 7 Consequently, the Helsinki Human Rights Federation released a
320. Id. at 38.
321. David Rennie, Bible Belt Missionaries Set Out on a 'War of Souls'in Iraq, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Dec. 27, 2003, at 22, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
322. Van Biema, supra note 4, at 40.
323. Id. at 44.
324. Id. at 43.
325. Id. at 44.
326. See supra notes 313-14 and accompanying text.
327. REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 372. Even the Salvation Army was
unable to receive permission to operate in one of Spain's regions on the grounds that it is a "destructive
sect." Id.
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report in April 1999 criticizing Spain for discrimination against "new religions."
328
Similarly, in Armenia all religious denominations other than the Armenian
Apostolic Church are required to register with the State Council on Religious
Affairs. Organizations petitioning for registration are required, among other
things, to "subscribe to a doctrine based on 'historically recognized Holy
Scriptures.' 329 The Armenian government has consistently denied registration to
the Jehovah's Witnesses.330 In Georgia, "[1]ocal police and security officials at
times harassed nontraditional religious minority groups and were complicit or
failed to respond to attacks by Orthodox extremists against Jehovah's Witnesses
and other nontraditional religious minorities." 33  The German government has
refused to recognize Scientology as a religion, and for some time has been
"investigating" its ideology to determine whether Scientology is compatible with
the democratic order.332  Scientologists often experience employment
discrimination in Germany, as some state and local government offices and
businesses "require job applicants and bidders on contracts to sign a 'sect filter,'
stating that they are not affiliated with the teachings of L. Ron Hubbard and do not
use the technologies of L. Ron Hubbard., 333 Other states that have taken action
against "harmful sects" or "cults" include Belgium
334 and France. 335
In addition to enacting restrictions on non-traditional religions, some modem
Christian states-in particular, those where the Orthodox church is dominant-
place restrictions on proselytism. These restrictions on proselytism are often
enforced against other Christian denominations. The laws of Greece, for example,
provide that "[a]nyone engaging in proselytism shall be liable to imprisonment and
a fine." 336 Greek law defines proselytism as attempts to "intrude on the religious
beliefs of a person of a different religious persuasion" through improper means,
such as "any kind of inducement or promise of an inducement or moral support or
material assistance, or by fraudulent means or by taking advantage of his
inexperience, trust, need, low intellect, or naivety.' '337 These anti-proselytism laws
were at issue in the landmark case Kokkinakis v. Greece,338 in which the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) overturned the conviction of Mr. Kokkinakis, a
Jehovah's Witness, under the anti-proselytism law.33 9  The ECHR noted that
328. Id.
329. Id. at 224.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 275.
332. Id. at 280.
333. Id. at 284.
334. Id. at 241-44.
335. Id. at 273-74.




339. Id. For more on Kokkinakis, see Joseph Brossart, Legitimate Regulation of Religion?
European Court of Human Rights Religious Freedom Doctrine and the Russian Federation Law "On
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, " 22 B.C. INT'L COMP. L. REv. 297, 302-05
(1999); Keturah A. Dunne, Addressing Religious Intolerance in Europe: The Limited Application of
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Greece had offered no evidence which indicated that Mr. Kokkinakis had
employed improper means to lead others to his faith.34 ° Instead, it appeared that
the conviction of Mr. Kokkinakis stemmed from hostility toward his attempts to
convert the wife of an orthodox cantor. Thus, the ECHR struck down the
conviction as a violation of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, which is designed to safeguard freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion.34 1 However, the Court did not strike the law down as a whole. Instead,
the ECHR stated that it would recognize the law's legitimacy "if and in so far as
[the law was] designed only to punish improper proselytism.,
342
Similar to Greece's anti-proselytism laws, Armenian law "forbids
'proselytizing' (undefined in the law) except by the Armenian Apostolic
Church., 343 In Bulgaria, a Communist-era law adopted in 1949 which prohibits
foreigners from evangelizing or leading religious services in the country is still
technically in effect. 344 Pursuant to this law, some municipalities have adopted
laws designed to inhibit proselytism efforts that are not undertaken by the
Orthodox Church. For example, one municipality enacted a regulation that
"forbids references to miracles and healing during religious services."
345
Observers fear that such regulations could be used "as a pretext to ban or interrupt
services by charismatic evangelical groups.,
34 6
In certain other majority Christian countries, proselytism by other faiths or
denominations is not prohibited by law, but is impeded in practice. For example,
Belarus has stringent registration requirements for religions that operate within
it. 347 While there is no theoretical barrier to proselytizing in that country, the State
Department has noted that Belarusian "authorities have intervened to prevent,
interfere with, or punish individuals who proselytize on behalf of an unregistered
religion. 3 48  And in Romania, "several minority religious groups continued to
claim credibly that low-level government officials and the Romanian Orthodox
clergy impeded their efforts at proselytizing. 349
The Russian Orthodox Church's concern over other sects' proselytism in
Russia also illustrates the perception of high-ranking church members that the
Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 30 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 117, 133-39 (1999); Lehnhof, supra note 133, at 594-96.
340. Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21, 49.
341. Id. at 21, 49-50.
342. Id. at 21, 48; see also REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 286 (noting that in
addition to Greece's anti-proselytism laws, other Greek governmental policies are obviously intended to
promote the Greek Orthodox church. For example, non-Orthodox groups "sometimes face
administrative obstacles or encounter legal restrictions on religious practice" that the Orthodox Church
does not face).
343. REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 224.
344. Id. at 250-52.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 235-37.
348. Id. at 238.
349. Id. at 339-40.
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Orthodox Church possesses a geographical sphere of influence. The Russian
Orthodox Church's leadership believes that the church was greatly disadvantaged
in its efforts to gain new adherents and to keep old adherents within its fold by the
atheistic system that predominated during the Soviet reign. 350 As such, the Russian
Orthodox Church has been very sensitive to what it perceives as intrusion into its
sphere of influence. Professor Harold Berman has explained that a Church
representative told him
that the Lutherans should be free to give religious leadership to the German
population of Russia, the Roman Catholics to the Polish population of Russia,
the Jews to the Jews, the Muslims to the Turks in Russia, and so forth-but the
Russians... the ethnic Russians, the russkie, he said, belong chiefly to Russian
Orthodoxy.
351
Professor Berman recounts that he argued with the representative, explaining
that the vast majority of missionaries do not draw Russians away from Russian
Orthodoxy, but rather from the ranks of atheists and agnostics. 352  The
representative was unimpressed by this argument: "It is true that after more than 75
years of Marxist-Leninist education and Communist Party pressure, a great many
Russians are ignorant of Russian Orthodoxy or indifferent to it. But their roots are
Orthodox. It is our task to return them to Orthodoxy. 353 When Professor Berman
opined that it sounded as though the Russian church feared competition, the
representative replied:
The Russian Orthodox Church is like a very sick person that is only beginning to
recover her health .... Moreover ... we lack both the material and the human
resources needed to compete on an equal basis. The foreign missionaries are
pouring huge sums of money into evangelization, paying for billboard
advertisements and for television programs featuring American preachers and
hiring huge stadiums for spreading their message.
354
One of the foreign missionary groups that the Russian church feels most
threatened by is the Catholic Church. This rift was widened by a Vatican decision
in February 2002 to carve the nation into four new dioceses. While the Vatican
"characterized the move as an almost routine elevation of its Russian operations to
the same status maintained by virtually every other Catholic presence
worldwide, 355 the Russian Orthodox Church did not share that view. Rather, a
representative of the Russian Church stated: "Our attitude toward this step is the
350. See Irina G. Basova, Freedom Under Fire: The New Russian Religious Law, 14 TEMP. INT'L
& COMp. L.J. 181, 184-86 (2000) (detailing the Soviet Union's repression of the Russian Orthodox
Church).
351. Harold J. Berman, Religious Rights in Russia at a Time of Tumultuous Transitions: A
Historical Theory, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 301 (Johan van der Vyver &
John Witte eds., 1996).
352. Id. at 301-02.
353. Id. at 302.
354. Id. at 303.
355. Michael Wines, Catholics Upgrade Presence in Russia, Annoying Orthodox, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
12, 2002, at A3.
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same as the Catholics' if we were to appoint an alternative pope in Rome. 356
The Russian Orthodox Church's views are particularly important to other
religions and denominations operating within that country because of the "growing
convergence between the Russian Orthodox Church and the State." '357 Indeed, the
church's influence may help account for the "Law on Religion" that Russia
implemented in 1997, which "seriously disadvantages religious groups that are
new to the country by making it difficult for them to register as religious
organizations, and thus obtain the status of juridical person.,
358
Thus, efforts within some modem Christian states to restrict non-traditional
faiths and to impede conversion out of the dominant sect demonstrate that state
enforcement of orthodoxy is still used as a method of preserving the religion's
sphere of influence.
3. Military Defense of the Sphere of Influence
The strategy of preserving and expanding a Christian sphere of influence
through military means manifests itself in two major ways at present. First, in
Western countries, some Christian groups use their political power to persuade the
state to adopt foreign policies that are more consonant with the defense of
Christianity. Second, while Western countries appear unlikely in the near future to
go to war for religious reasons, a number of battles have been raging between
Christians and Muslims in lesser-developed countries for years. These conflicts
are likely to intensify as the population of these lesser-developed countries
continues to rapidly expand.
Of the industrialized Western countries, Christian groups exert the most
influence on foreign policy in the United States. A number of commentators have
noted the Christian lobby's strength, particularly with respect to ensuring
continued American support for the state of Israel. 35 9  Rabbi Daniel Lapin has
succinctly summarized the importance of evangelical support for Israel by stating:
"The Bible Belt is Israel's security belt." 360 The chairman of the Ethics and
Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention has explained
356. Id.
357. REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 349.
358. Id.
359. See, e.g., Stephen Farrell, Behold, Lions for Zion, TIMES (London), Oct. 30, 2003, at 12
(stating that Christian conservatives' "unswerving financial, political and moral support for Israel has
made them a force that no US President, senator or congressman can ignore at election time"); Craig
Nelso, Israel Finds an Ally in U.S. Evangelicals; Christian Zionists Provide Moral, Monetary Support
in Religious War, AUSTIN AM-STATESMAN (Tex.), Jan. 4, 2004, at Al ("Christian Zionists... provide
not only moral support [for Israel] but also substantial funds to Israel's sputtering economy, and they've
proven their political clout in the Bush White House.").
360. Laura Blumenfeld, Terrorism Jars Jewish, Arab Party Loyalties, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2003,
at Al.
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that two major theological reasons underlie evangelical Christians' support for
Israel: "The reason most evangelicals support Israel is that we believe in the Bible.
God gave Israel to the Jews. We believe God gave that land to them forever. The
second reason is that God says he would bless those who bless Israel and curse
those who curse Israel."36 1
The influence that evangelical support for Israel has had in maintaining the
United States' special relationship of support for the Jewish state is one illustration
of the Christian lobby's foreign policy clout in the United States. The Christian
lobby also pushes for the U.S. government to implement legislation relevant to the
rights of Christians abroad. For example, Christian groups lobbied heavily for the
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA).362 IRFA promotes religious
freedom overseas by creating three new governmental bodies tasked with that
responsibility, including the Department of State's Office on International
Religious Freedom. 363  The Office on International Religious Freedom issues
annual reports on the state of religious freedom in foreign states, advises the
President and Secretary of State on international religious freedom issues, and
diplomatically represents the United States on religious freedom issues.3 4 Also, in
response to the Islamist group Laskar Jihad's brutal campaign against Christians in
Indonesia, a senior fellow at Freedom House's Center for Religious Freedom
suggested that the war on terrorism could include a resumption of military ties with
Indonesia in order to train and reform its military, coupled with applied pressure
for Indonesia to clamp down on its violent Islamists.
3 65
In terms of perception, some observers, particularly within the Muslim world,
view the war on terror as a series of military adventures designed to promote
Christian interests and to topple Islam.366 The U.S. government, on the other hand,
361. Maura Reynolds, Bush Commitment is Key to 'Road Map 'for Mideast, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30,
2003, at 17 (quoting Richard Land); see also Susan Page, Mideast Presents Next Big Gamble for Bush,
USA TODAY, June 3, 2003, at 6A (noting that "evangelical Christians ... see support of Israel as a
matter of Biblical prophecy"); Yonat Shimron, Zionism in Two Varieties, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Apr. 11, 2003, at E3 (explaining Christian Zionism).
362. Pub. L. No. 105-292, 112 Stat. 2787 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22
U.S.C.). For a description of Christian groups lobbying for IRFA's passage, see McCormick, supra
note 199, at 330-31. However, IRFA is not narrowly focused on Christian concerns; rather, it
encompasses all religious groups that suffer from persecution abroad. See T. Jeremy Gunn, A
Preliminary Response to Criticisms of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 2000 BYU L.
REV. 841, 851-56 (2000).
363. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6411, 6431 (1998); 50 U.S.C. § 402(i) (1998).
364. See 22 U.S.C. § 6411(c).
365. Paul Marshall, Jihad Comes to Indonesia; Bin Laden's Allies Attempt a Hostile Takeover,
WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 31, 2001/Jan. 7, 2002, at 20. Marshall also makes a realist case for engaging
the Indonesian military, noting that "Indonesia controls most of the sea routes to Asia .... An Islamist
or fragmented Indonesia would have dramatic repercussions for the politics of Asia and the world and
would present a national security nightmare for the United States." Id.
366. See, e.g., Michael Scott Doran, The Saudi Paradox, FOREIGN AFF., Jan. 2004/Feb. 2004, at 35
(observing that, following May 2003 suicide bombings in Riyadh, Saudi clerics defended the attackers
as "the flower of the mujahideen," and decreed that any assistance that citizens provided in capturing
those responsible "would constitute aid to the United States in its war against Islam"); Kenya:
Commentary Says USA Using "Weapons of Mass Deception" Against Islam, BBC MONITORING INT'L
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has repeatedly stated that it is not pursuing a war against Islam.3 67 Despite this, the
view that the United States has pursued the war on terror out of a base desire to
advance Christian interests is widely held in the Muslim world, and even some
highly-educated Westerners share this view. For example, Sol Encel, an
Australian emeritus professor of sociology, described President Bush's use of the
word "crusade" to describe the war on terrorism
368 as "a gigantic Freudian slip." 36
9
Encel opined that "[a]lthough the spin doctors quickly realized the negative
implications of this usage, which was then retracted, I believe that... the original
message was the real one." 370 Regardless of the merits of Encel's analysis-and
personally, I believe that his analysis is asinine-the fact that a sociology professor
from a Western country holds these views demonstrates the propensity for a
perceived linkage between the war on terror and Christian interests.
37'
Moving beyond Western countries' foreign policy, a number of conflicts have
been raging between Christians and Muslims for years. One obvious example is
the battle between Christian Serbs and Muslims in the former Yugoslavia.7 In
fact, "[t]he Serbian massacre of Bosnian Muslims at Srebenica in 1995 remains the
REPORTS, Jan. 4, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File (quoting an article
published in a Kenyan newspaper, which stated that America has been attempted to "equate Islam with
radicalism and terrorism," and that "[t]he events of 11 September provided it with the perfect
opportunity to wage war against Islam as an ideology"); Yasmin Moll, A Shattered Dream, EGYPT
TODAY, Dec. 10, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File (quoting a Muslim
professor as fingering an "alliance between Christian fundamentalists, neo-cons and Zionists" who say
"this is a war against Islam... that Islam is the largest 'weapon of mass destruction"').
367. See, e.g., Pamela Hess, DOD to Investigate General's Speeches, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Oct. 21,
2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File ("After briefly characterizing the war on
terror as a 'crusade,' Bush has since taken pains to praise Islam, to differentiate terrorists from the
faithful and to meet with Muslim leaders at the White House."); Rice Reaffirms That War on Terror is
Not War on Islam, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), Oct. 20, 2003, at AI0, available at LEXIS,
News Library, News Group File.
368. See John Kifner, Forget the Past: It's a War Unlike Any Other, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001, §
4, at 8 ("President Bush at first spoke of a 'crusade' against evil, a word the White House swiftly
retracted when its implications became clear."); Dick Polman, So Far, Bush Handling Role as War
Leader with Aplomb, PHtLADELPHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 23, 2001, at Al ("Critics also winced last week
when Bush urged a crusade against evil-perhaps unaware that the word offends many Muslims, who
associate it with the Christian holy war against their forebears.").
369. Sol Encel, September 11 and Its Implications for Sociology; World Trade Center and
Pentagon Attacks, 2001, 223 J. Soc. 38(3), 226 (Sept. 1, 2002), available at: http://jos.sagepub.com/.
370. Id.
371. For more on other Westerners' perception that the war on terror is actually a "global crusade,"
see Slovene Dailies Say US Administration Causing Global Instability, BBC MONITORING INT'L
REPORTS, Nov. 11, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File (quoting a Slovene daily
as opining that "Messianic-inspired Christian fundamentalists are using [the claim that Islamic terrorism
threatens Western democracies] for a modem-age Crusade under the pretence that they are leading a
war on terror"); Natasha Wallace, PM Has No Intention of Helping Aust. Detainees in Cuba, AAP
NEWSFEED, Feb. 7, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File (quoting an Australian
politician who described President Bush as a "Christian fundamentalist," and likened "his war on
terrorism to the Christian crusades").
372. See Holger Jensen, Bombs Can 't Spread Love, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver, Colo.),
Mar. 23, 1999, at 2A.
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largest single crime of its kind in post-1945 Europe. 373  Another example is
Sudan, where a civil war that raged between the Muslim north and Christian and
animist south between 1983 and 2004 left more than two million dead.374 In
Nigeria, "a million died in a Muslim-Christian clash between 1967 and 1970" and
"religion-related violence continues to erupt" to this day.375
Professor Jenkins notes that while "Christians have committed their share of
atrocities," at present "there is no question that the threat of intolerance and
persecution chiefly comes from the Islamic side of the equation. '376 However,
especially as demographic trends shift the center of Christendom southward,
Professor Jenkins warns that there could arise "a future Christendom not too
different from the old, defined less by any ideological harmony than by its unity
against a common outside threat."377 In that case, Professor Jenkins warns: "We
must hope that the new Res Publica Christiana does not confront an equally
militant Muslim world, Dar al-Islam, or else we really will have gone full circle
back to the worst features of the thirteenth century."
378
4. Church Assertion of Greater Authority than the State
Today the Christian faith sometimes asserts that it possesses greater authority
than the state. Such assertions occasionally manifest themselves in the Western
world. One prominent example is former Chief Justice Roy Moore of Alabama,
who was removed from the bench after refusing a federal court's order to remove a
statue of the Ten Commandments that he had placed outside his courthouse.379
The justification that both Moore and his supporters proffered for keeping the
statue in place was explicitly religious. Moore stated: "When a federal judge tells
373. JENKINS, supra note 17, at 170.
374. See Julia Duin, Finding the Way; Local Church Helps Sudan's 'Lost Boys,' WASH. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 2002, at A2; Ted Fry, In Search of "Heaven" in America, Sudanese Boys Lost in
Heartbreaking Limbo, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 6, 2004, at H21; Colum Lynch, Sudan Accused of
Blocking Darfur Relief, WASH. POST, May 28, 2004, at AI5 (stating that in 2004, the Bush
administration "brokerted] an agreement to end [the] 2 1-year civil war").
375. Robert McClory, Faith: Catalyst to Inflame or Unite?, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 14, 2003, at 7; see
also Davan Maharaj, The World; Tension Fills Air Ahead of Nigeria Vote; Many Fear That Violent
Sectarian Clashes, Pending the Outcome of Today's National Poll, Could Undermine the Fledgling
Democracy, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2003, at 12 (stating that about 10,000 Nigerians have died in clashes
between Christians and Muslims since 1999).
376. JENKINS, supra note 17, at 170.
377. Id. at 190.
378. Id. Such a world would, in all likelihood, probably be far worse than the worst features of the
thirteenth century. Professor Jenkins conjures images of "a wave of religious conflicts reminiscent of
the Middle Ages, a new age of Christian crusades and Muslim jihads. Imagine the world of the
thirteenth century armed with nuclear warheads and anthrax." Id. at 13.
379. See John Johnson, Panel Removes Alabama's 'Ten Commandments Judge,' L.A. TIMES, Nov.
14, 2003, at Al.
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the state of Alabama that we cannot acknowledge God, we have a serious
problem."380 The national director of Operation Rescue/Operation Save America
went even further, stating that Moore was "initiating the second American
Revolution."
38'
More significant, though, are Christians in the Southern hemisphere whose
loyalty to their faith outweighs their loyalty to the state.382 These Christians'
loyalty to their religion may pose a significant challenge to the countries in which
they reside, as many of them live in weak states. Robert Kaplan has observed that
in such states "criminal anarchy emerges as the real 'strategic' danger," as
characterized by "the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and
regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness
of war."383 Under such conditions, the fact that many citizens' loyalties lie not
with the state but with their faith will have a dramatic impact.
V. CONCLUSION
Understanding that many Christians and Muslims believe that their faiths
possess geographical spheres of influence yields both predictive and prescriptive
conclusions. This Conclusion first addresses the predictive implications that can
be drawn from recognition of this framework. It then turns to the prescriptive
implications.
A. Predictive Implications
Predictively, one may conclude that Christians and Muslims will continue to
attempt to define, defend, and expand their religions' spheres of influence, just as
adherents to both faiths have historically done. The idea of spheres of influence-
as theologically rooted in the concept of dar al-Harb and dar al-Islam-has
informed the Islamic view of international relations for over a millennium.
Similarly, many Christians have perceived a powerful linkage between the faith
and the state ever since the Christianization of the Roman Empire.3 4 In particular,
they perceive Christianity as possessing spheres of influence in relation to Islam.
Christians and Muslims have historically used a variety of methods-ranging
from proselytism to armed struggle-to define, defend, and expand these perceived
spheres of influence.385 Just as adherents to both faiths will likely continue to
believe that their religions possess geographical spheres of influence, they will
likely continue to embrace the use of many of the mechanisms that have
historically defended and expanded these spheres. Although reliance on each of
these various methods of preserving the faiths' perceived spheres of influence will




382. See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
383. Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1994, at 44, 46, 48.
384. See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
385. See supra Parts III and IV (explaining the strategies employed to preserve and expand the
Christian and Muslim spheres of influence).
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The reaction of believers to intrusions into their faith's perceived sphere of
influence is likely to be most violent when the faith's preeminent position appears
to be threatened. This reaction has been true historically. For Christianity, both
the Crusades and reconquista were reactions to substantial threats to the Christian
sphere of influence. Similarly, the Inquisition was perhaps fiercest in Spain
because, after the Moors conquered Spain, Spanish Christians viewed minority
faiths as more of a threat than did Christians from elsewhere in Europe.3 8 6 More
recently, the extreme reaction to the theory of evolution in the United States was
triggered by many Christians' concern that science might displace their faith.387
And Islam, since the time of Muhammad's ascendancy as a head of state, has been
associated with a system of shariah that is designed to ensure the faith's
supremacy. When dominant understandings of the shariah are flouted, for
example, by the conspicuous presence of Christian missionaries in the Muslim
world, Muslims will perceive a greater threat to their faith's dominance. Christian
missionaries in Muslim countries are often subject to violent attacks because many
Muslims perceive them as threatening the virtual monopoly on religious expression
that Islam has enjoyed in these societies.88
Moreover, Muslims will likely continue to be especially wary of Christianity,
while Christians are likely continue to be especially wary of Islam; after all, both
states' perceived spheres of influence have largely been defined in relation to each
other for over a millennium. Highlighting the intensity of the conflict between
these faiths, Bernard Lewis has noted that "[t]he confrontation between Ottoman
Islam and European Christendom has often been likened to the Cold War of the
second half of the twentieth century."389 Because of the length and intensity of the
conflict between the two faiths, coupled with the fact that they remain the world's
two largest religions and two of the modem world's major civilizational forces,
adherents to both faiths are intensely aware of the other religion.
B. Prescriptive Implications
The understanding that Christians and Muslims believe that their faiths
possess geographic spheres of influence also yields prescriptive implications. In
terms of future relations between the two faiths, an awareness and sensitivity to
this perception may be able to reduce the propensity for violent clashes. The
contours and implications of such sensitivity to perceived religious spheres of
influence would be a fruitful and important area for future research.
In terms of prosecution of the war on terrorism, one important goal that
Western countries should keep in mind is avoiding policies that inadvertently
386. See supra notes 282-84 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 289-91 and accompanying text.
388. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
389. LEWIS, supra note 116, at 33. Lewis himself is not completely convinced by the analogy. For
example, he finds the difference in movement of refugees to be significant: "In the twentieth century
this movement was, overwhelmingly, from East to West; in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and even in the
seventeenth centuries, it was primarily from West to East." Id. Regardless of the difference between
the two conflicts, the fact that this analogy is taken seriously can help to provide the reader with some
sense of the intensity of the conflict between the two faiths.
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increase support for terrorist groups. Thus, it is essential that policymakers are
sensitive to both the historical and contemporary relations between Islam and
Christianity. As Professor Charles Kimball stated in response to a missionary's
comment that the bombing of Iraq was a "ripeness moment" to the extent that it
caused Muslims to question their God's power: "This is an area that lives with a
history of crusades and in the shadow of colonialism. The image of an
overwhelming military power coming in already provokes major questions about
deeper U.S. intentions." 9
A thorough understanding of the historical relations between Christianity and
Islam, as well as the manner in which both religions continue to vie with each
other for more believers and more influence, can help the United States and its
allies to avoid taking actions that may be perceived as attacks on Islam itself.
One way that Western countries engaged in the war on terrorism can help to
avoid the perception that they are engaged in an all-out battle against Islam is by
more clearly delineating who the enemy is in this war. While the U.S. government
has gone to great pains to emphasize that the war on terror is not actually a war
against Islam, a fair question is precisely against whom or what the war on
terrorism is being fought. Daniel Pipes has noted that this question "has far-
reaching implications for strategy, for public diplomacy, and for foreign and
domestic policy alike," but that the answer is not obvious. 39' Immediately
following the September 11 attacks, President Bush spoke in generalities, referring
to the "evildoers" or "the evil ones" rather than to a specific enemy against whom
the war on terror was directed.392 Now, more than three years after the September
1 th attacks, the answer has still not been adequately defined through official
channels. To illuminate this problem, we can ask whether the "war on terror" is
being waged against all terrorists. If so, why are the FARC in Colombia,3 93 and
Jewish terrorist groups Kach and Kahane Chai 394 seemingly not viewed as a part of
the war on terror? If the war on terror does not encompass all terrorists, is it being
waged against the more limited class of terrorist organizations that potentially pose
a direct threat to the United States, or to Americans? Or is this war being waged
more broadly against extremist Islamist ideology, such as the radical Wahhabi
sect?
Because no answer to these questions is immediately apparent, numerous
commentators have noted the open-ended nature of the present conflict.395 When
390. Van Biema, supra note 4, at 44.
391. Daniel Pipes, Who is the Enemy? Analysis of United States War on Terrorism, COMMENT, Jan.
2002, at 21, available at http://www.danielpipes.org/pf.php?id=103.
392. Id.
393. See, e.g., 11 Killed in Colombian City, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2003, at A13 (describing a
terrorist attack blamed on the FARC); Juan Forero, Rebels Execute 10 Hostages in Colombia, N.Y.
TIMES, May 6, 2003, at A14 (describing another FARC atrocity).
394. See, e.g., Ron Csillag, Rabbi Compares Kach Founder to Moshe Rabeinu, CANADIAN JEWISH
NEWS, Nov. 27, 2003, at 6 (providing background on both groups); Jerry Seper, 4 Jewish Web Sites
Deemed 'Terrorist'; Designation Carrying U.S. Sanctions Extended to Internet for 1st Time, WASH.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2003, at A2 (providing background on both groups).
395. See, e.g., Editorial, Noble Goal in Iraq Lacks Moral Foundation, NAT'L CATHOLIC REP., Dec.
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the war on terror appears more open-ended, and when the enemy appears ill-
defined, there is a greater chance of the war on terror being misperceived as a war
against Islam itself. Policymakers should think critically about how they define
the scope of the war. A clear definition of the enemy, and a clear definition of the
war's objective, will reap many benefits.
The Islamic sphere of influence is very real to many Muslims, and legitimate
actions that Western countries take to ensure their own security may be seen as
attempts to expand the Christian sphere of influence. If this fact is clearly
understood, policymakers may be able to formulate their methods to take account
of the perceived Muslim sphere of influence, and thus minimize the probability of
walking into a broader and more deadly conflict than they intended.
12, 2003, at 32, available at http:/natcath.org/NCR Online/archives2/2003d/121202/121202s.htm (last
visited Oct. 23, 2004); Simon Tisdall, Resist All Official Pol-Speak, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 13,
2003, at 14.
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